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This dissertation consists of three independent essays addressing several key issues related 
to the empirical application of optimum currency area. The first essay explores the features of the 
CFA franc zone by operationalizing Robert Mundell’s (1952) criteria for an optimum currency 
area. A vector autoregression method is used in modeling national outputs as determined by 
global, regional and country-specific shocks. It finds that domestic outputs of the CFA franc zone 
countries are strongly influenced by country-specific shocks. These results suggest that the CFA 
franc zone countries are structurally different from each other and the monetary union may have 
been a costly arrangement for the member countries.  
The second essay focuses on the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU).  A 2-vairable 
vector autoregressive model is estimated to investigate the extent of symmetric shocks in the 
small open economies of the ECCU. The paper finds that domestic outputs of the ECCU 
countries are strongly influenced by regional shocks. These results indicate that the ECCU 
countries are structurally similar to each other and exchange arrangements appear to have well 
served the region and the group of countries is more likely to be an optimum currency area.  
The third essay explores the possibility of a currency union in East Asia. In this essay, the 
extent of global and regional integration in East Asia is investigated using the stock price index as 
a measure of economic performance. A similar VAR model is employed to separate the 
underlying shocks into global, regional and country-specific shocks. The estimation results show 
that country-specific shocks play a dominant role in East Asia although their role appears to have 
declined over time, especially after the 1997 financial crisis. Global and regional shocks are 
responsible for small but increasing shares of stock price fluctuations in most countries. The 
results indicate that, despite years of liberalization and regional integration, economies in East 
Asia remain dissimilar and are subject to asymmetric shocks and it might be costly for East Asian 
countries to abandon monetary policy independence to form a monetary union and that a more 
flexible exchange rate regime might be desirable.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
  
The theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) lists conditions regarded as crucial for 
the success of a common currency in a region. The conditions include the symmetry of 
shocks across countries (Mundell, 1961), openness of the economies (McKinnon, 1963), 
and well-diversified economies (Kenen, 1969), all of which tend to reduce the confusion 
and uncertainty in relative price changes and transaction costs among members of a 
currency area. In this dissertation, I devote three essays to explore the features of 
currently existing and proposed monetary union in the world: the CFA franc zone, the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and the potential Asian Monetary Union 
(AMU).  We compare the features of those monetary unions to those of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) by operationalizing the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
criteria. This dissertation asks the question: are those monetary unions satisfying OCA 
criteria or are the regions ready for a single currency?  
In the first essay, I study features of the CFA franc zone. The CFA (French African 
Community in French) franc has been in use in the former French colonies of West and 
Central Africa since 1945. It was pegged to the French franc and after 1999 to the euro. 
The CFA franc zone is remarkably diverse ethnically, lingually, culturally, politically, 
and economically. The currency survived devaluations (by 50 percent in 1994), changes 
of regimes (from colonial to independent), the existence of two groups of members with 
two central banks (the West African Economic and Monetary Union and the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community), controls of trade and capital flows. 
Although the monetary union has existed for nearly 60 years, there are only a few studies 
that exist to answer the question if the CFA franc zone forms an optimum currency area.  
To answer the question, I operationalize the theory of optimum currency area with a 
model in which national output is determined by three types of shocks: global, regional, 
and country-specific. The relative role of regional shocks is taken as the key indicator of 
suitability for a country to join a common currency area with the regional neighbors. 12 
CFA franc zone countries are chosen. (Chad and Equatorial Guinea are excluded for data 
inadequacy) Output is represented by value-added industrial production. Annual data are 
examined from 1970 to 2004. Forecast error variance decompositions are used to show 
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the relative importance of global, regional and country-specific shocks in explaining 
domestic output fluctuations. My results find that domestic outputs of the CFA franc zone 
countries are strongly influenced by country-specific shocks while regional shocks are far 
more important in European countries that have joined the EMU. The results suggest that 
the CFA franc zone countries are structurally different from each other and thus more 
likely to be subject to asymmetric shocks. They do not appear to form an optimum 
currency area and the monetary union may have been a costly arrangement for the 
member countries. 
In the second essay, another long-lasting currency union, the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union (ECCU) is investigated. Throughout the turbulence in the international 
financial system, the Eastern Caribbean countries have enjoyed remarkable monetary and 
economic stability. There are two significant aspects of the ECCU countries: their very 
small size and the similar colonial background. The ECCU is a very small economy even 
taken as a whole. The total population of the ECCU is approximately half a million. The 
small market size of the ECCU limits opportunity for economies of scale, competition, 
and diversification of production and trade. The English-speaking ECCU members share 
a common colonial background. They were all British colonial territories before their 
independences were governed.  
This essay attempts to characterize the types of structural shocks in the ECCU and 
other countries in the Caribbean region and to compare them with other currency unions 
such as the CFA franc zone and the EMU. Mundell’s criteria on the OCA are examined 
by using a 2-variable structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model and estimating the 
extent of symmetric shocks. Output is represented by real gross domestic production 
(constant 2000 US$). 8 ECCU member countries are chosen. In addition, another 8 non-
ECCU Caribbean countries are selected for comparison. Annual data are examined from 
1973 to 2005. Main findings are: domestic outputs of the ECCU countries are more 
strongly influenced by regional shocks compared to those of the CFA franc zone where 
country-specific shocks are dominant. The ECCU countries are structurally similar to 
each other and thus more likely to be subject to symmetric shocks. Their monetary and 
exchange arrangements appear to have well served the region and the group of countries 
is more likely to be an optimum currency area.  
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The third essay focuses on a recently proposed monetary union in East Asia. East Asia 
is a region with great potential for high economic growth given its excellent record of 
economic performance and has long been a focus of attention for economic research. 
Countries in East Asia have shown keen interest in regional integration in trade and 
financial matters. The purpose of this essay is to investigate the extent of global and 
regional integration in East Asia using the stock price index as a measure of economic 
performance. Stock price index is known as a good leading indicator of economic 
activity. The availability of high-frequency data is also a big advantage in our case where 
the sample period is short due to general data problems of developing countries and made 
even shorter as a result of the recent financial crisis and resulting structural breaks. A 
structural vector autoregressive model is used to estimate both East Asian stock markets 
and European stock markets. The essay chooses 12 major stock exchanges in East Asia 
and 16 European stock exchanges. Weekly data are examined from July 1, 1989 to 
December 31, 2006. Data from July 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998 are omitted because 
of large turmoil due to the financial crises in the region during the problem. We separate 
the selected periods into eight 2-year sub-periods. The estimation results show that 
country-specific shocks still play a dominant role in East Asia although their role appears 
to have declined over time, especially after the 1997 financial crisis. Global and regional 
shocks are responsible for small but increasing shares of stock price fluctuations in most 
countries. The results indicate that, despite years of liberalization and regional 
integration, economies in East Asia remain dissimilar and are subject to asymmetric 
shocks in comparison to European countries. This suggests that it might be costly to 
abandon monetary policy independence and that a more flexible exchange rate regime 
might be desirable.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Xiaodan Zhao 2008 
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Chapter Two 
Is the CFA Franc Zone an Optimum Currency Area? 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The successful launch of the euro has stimulated interest in other current and potential 
monetary unions. Formed in 1948, the CFA franc zone has been a long-lasting monetary 
union with 14 member countries. Remarkably, the exchange rate vs. the French franc (the 
euro, now) − the anchor currency − was changed only once in 1994. Notwithstanding 
such longevity in maintaining a monetary union and a fixed exchange rate, the CFA franc 
zone has received scant attention. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the working 
of the monetary union in the CFA franc zone and test whether countries in the zone form 
an optimum currency area (OCA) in comparison to those of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU).  
Participating in a monetary union entails important benefits and costs. The benefits 
include lower transaction costs, reduced uncertainty about exchange rate variability and 
relative price changes and enhanced confidence in the direction of policies. The costs 
arise from the inability to use independent monetary policy and flexible nominal 
exchange rate. The OCA theory identifies conditions for successful operation of a 
common currency. They include the symmetry or similarity of shocks across countries 
(Mundell, 1961), openness of the economies (McKinnon, 1963), and well-diversified 
economies (Kenen, 1969). The costs from participating in a currency area are likely to be 
smaller the more similarly member countries are affected by exogenous shocks, and the 
more open and the better diversified their economies, the higher the degree of factor 
mobility among the countries, the greater the flexibility in their wages and prices, and the 
greater the similarity in their inflation preferences. See, inter alia, De Grauwe (2005) and 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997).  
Do the 14 countries of the CFA franc zone form an optimum currency area? Although 
the monetary union has existed for nearly 60 years, there are only a few studies that exist 
to answer the question and their verdicts are mixed. Hoffmaister, Roldos, and Wickham 
(1998) compare the nature and sources of shocks in the CFA franc countries with those of 
fifteen neighboring countries in the sub-Saharan Africa which maintain more flexible 
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exchange rates. They find that the franc zone countries are relatively more susceptible to 
external shocks such as changes in the terms of trade. They attribute the finding to the 
inability of the exchange rate to play any substantive role as a partial buffer for external 
shocks in the CFA countries. The finding is consistent with the evidence reported in 
Ghosh et al (1997), who find that countries with fixed exchange rate regimes face higher 
real volatility.1 These studies tend to suggest that the CFA franc zone countries do not 
meet the conventional criteria for the formation of optimum currency area.2 
Fielding and Shields (2001) find that the members of the CFA franc zone, with the 
exception of Niger, share positively correlated inflation shocks. They also find that there 
are two groups of countries within which shocks to output growth are strongly positively 
correlated, but between which they are negatively correlated. Regarding the long-run 
impact of shocks on the economy, their results suggest a considerable degree of 
heterogeneity across the zone. They conclude that “the CFA, on the whole and assuming 
that it has the ability to conduct timely stabilization policy, is homogenous enough for a 
monetary union to work.” (p. 222) 
In this paper, we operationalize the theory of optimum currency area with a model in 
which national output is determined by three types of shocks: global, regional, and 
country-specific. The relative role of regional shocks is taken as the key indicator of 
suitability for a country to join a common currency area with the regional neighbors. We 
find that domestic outputs of the CFA franc zone countries are strongly influenced by 
country-specific shocks while regional shocks are far more important in European 
countries that have joined the Economic and Monetary Union. The results suggest that 
the CFA franc zone countries are structurally different from each other and thus more 
likely to be subject to asymmetric shocks. It is not likely to be an optimum currency area 
and the monetary union may have been a costly arrangement for the member countries. 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2.2 discusses the 
institutional arrangement in the CFA franc zone and its performance. Section 2.3 
describes the model and discusses the estimation method and Section 2.4 reports the 
                                               
1 In a similar context, Bleaney and Fielding (2002) report that the standard deviation of real GDP growth is 
significantly higher in the CFA franc zone countries than elsewhere. 
2 See M’Bet and Niamkey (1994) and Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) who make similar conclusions but 
using different methodologies. 
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estimation results. Robustness of the result is examined in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 
concludes.   
 
2.2 The CFA Franc Zone Arrangements: Institutional Aspects and Performance 
The CFA franc zone consists of two currency areas: West African Economic and 
Monetary Union and Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa.3 The former 
consists of eight western African countries - Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Their common currency is the “franc de la 
Communaute Financiere de l’Afrique” (CFA franc), which is issued by the Central Bank 
of the West African States (BCEAO) located in Dakar, Senegal. The latter comprises six 
countries -- Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon – and also uses the CFA franc called “franc de la 
Cooperation Financiere Africaine” issued by the Bank of the Central African States 
(BEAC) located in Yaounde, Cameroon. France guarantees the convertibility of the CFA 
franc through an operations account that each of the central banks holds at the French 
Treasury. As a counterpart to the guarantee of the French Treasury, each central bank in 
the CFA franc zone is obliged to maintain 65 percent of its official reserves in the 
operations account and the CFA franc zone must allow France to participate in the 
decision-making process within the currency arrangements. The guaranteed convertibility 
is the main item that distinguishes the zone from other fixed rate arrangements. The CFA 
franc zone members agreed on rules to avoid excessive deficits. Once pooled, the 
reserves become less vulnerable to external shocks because the economies of the unions 
become more diversified than the economy of each member. France has imposed 
important restrictions on the guarantee of convertibility that lessen significantly its 
applicability. In particular, in order to prevent excessive recourse to central bank 
financing of budget deficits, both central banks of the BCEAO and BEAC are required to 
incorporate two monetary rules in their respective agreements. Neither central bank is 
allowed to contribute to the central government budget more than 20 percent of the value 
of the previous year’s central government revenues. Monetary rules adopted by the CFA 
                                               
3 The composition of the CFA franc zone had changed over time with the departure (and subsequent reentry 
in the case of Mali) of some former French colonies and the entry in recent years of two sub-Saharan 
African countries that had no colonial relations with France and are not French-speaking (Equatorial 
Guinea in 1985 and Guinea-Bissau in 1997).  
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franc zone emphasize the maintenance of a positive balance of payments, with strict 
deflationary mechanisms and a tight control over credit policy to limit inflation as much 
as possible. The issue of full convertibility of the CFA franc through the French 
guarantee of the operations account minimizes some of the short term risks associated 
with current payment. However, the French attitude may change as the cost of 
maintaining the CFA franc zone climbs ever higher after the euro became the only legal 
tender and replaced the French franc on 30 June 2002.  
The two CFA francs are legal tenders only in their respective regions. However, 
because of the guaranteed convertibility into French francs, the free capital mobility 
between each region and France, and the fact that the two CFA francs have the same 
parity against the French franc, the CFA franc zone has traditionally been considered as 
one currency area with a single currency. France is represented in the executive boards of 
the two regional central banks and has traditionally been the main trading partner and the 
provider of extensive technical and financial assistance to all member countries. The 
structure of the CFA franc zone, as a currency union with a fixed exchange rate and 
significant operational involvement of the anchor currency country in the functioning of 
the union, is fairly unique, even among monetary unions.  
The CFA franc was issued initially by the central bank for France’s overseas territories 
and the parity of CFA franc was set in October 1948 at 0.5 CFA franc per French franc. 
However, the responsibility for issuing currency and overseeing the functioning of the 
zone was shifted to two regional central banks with the independence of former colonies 
in the early 1960s. These banks had originally been dominated by France, but by the 
early 1970s their control shifted to the member countries.  
Countries in the CFA franc zone had fairly limited degree of economic and financial 
integration and regional cooperation until 1994. A host of administrative restrictions, tax 
distortions and protectionist trade policies precluded the development of intra-regional 
trade of a single market.  Preserving the special economic and political links to France 
appeared to have dominated decisions of policymakers in the CFA franc zone. During the 
period from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s, the economic performance of the CFA 
franc countries compared favorably with that of other sub-Saharan African countries with 
stronger GDP growth and lower inflation. However, during 1986-93, in the face of a 
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nearly 40 percent cumulative deterioration in the terms of trade, a strong French franc 
combined occasionally with deflationary pro-cyclical fiscal policies, the growth 
performance of the CFA franc zone weakened considerably, leading to a substantial 
depreciation of the CFA franc by 50 percent in January 1994.  
Notwithstanding the considerable progress achieved since 1994, the CFA franc zone 
countries remain confronted with sizable domestic and external imbalances and continue 
to be subject to structural rigidities and vulnerable to exogenous shocks. It remains a 
fairly heterogeneous entity, composed of countries fairly open to international trade but 
with very limited intra-regional trade and highly dependent on the production and export 
of a limited number of primary commodities. The asymmetric economic development 
among the countries in the zone makes this situation even worse. The zone is dominated 
by Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, which account for about 43 percent and 36 percent of 
their regional output in 2004, respectively. The per capita GDP of the richest country, 
Equatorial Guinea, at US$ 3988 in 2004, was 29 times larger than that of the poorest 
country, Guinea-Bissau. 
2.3 Model 
We employ the model developed by Chow and Kim (2003), in which domestic output, 
y
d, is assumed to be affected by three kinds of shocks - global shock, regional shock and 
country-specific shock (ug, ur, and ud):  
0 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( )
d g r d
t t t t
y L u L u L uβ β β β∆ = + + +     (1) 
where 2 30 1 2 3( )i i i i iL L L Lβ β β β β= + + + +L  is a polynomial function of the lag 
operator, L.  We assume that global shocks affect economies both inside and outside the 
regional boundary. The two large oil crises of the 1970s may be a good example of the 
global nature. Regional shocks are assumed to affect the economies within the region. 
German unification of 1990 and the passage of the single European act in 1993 may be 
termed regional shocks for European countries. In the context of CFA countries, sharp 
changes in the commodity prices may qualify as a regional shock to the extent that the 
member countries are similarly affected by the shock. Country-specific shocks are 
defined as those that only affect a particular economy. It arises due to a change in fiscal 
or monetary policy or a change in productivity or the terms of trade.  
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Following Chow and Kim (2003), we assume that global, regional and local outputs, 
r
t
g
t
yy , and d
t
y , are related to the three structural shocks as follows: 
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
g g
t t
r y
t t
d d
t t
y A L A L A L u
y A L A L A L u
y A L A L A L u
   ∆  
    
∆ =    
    ∆     
   (2) 
where 0 1 2 2( )
ij ij ij ij
A L a a L a L= + + +L  is a 3×3 matrix of polynomial functions of lag 
operators. We assume that the structural shocks are uncorrelated and of unit variance: 
IuVar
t
=)( . Structural shocks are unobserved and the following three additional 
restrictions are employed to recover them from reduced-form innovations: (1) and (2) 
neither regional nor country-specific shocks have long-run effects on global output; (3) 
country-specific shocks have no long-run effects on regional output. In this model, the 
economy is considered to be small in a region and the region is only a small part of the 
global economy.4 In terms of the coefficient matrix, these restrictions can be restated as: 
0)1()1()1( 231312 === AAA        where 
0 1 2(1)
ij ij ij ij
A a a a= + + +L  
In this model, the relative importance of regional shocks in the determination of the 
local output is considered the key indicator of suitability of the local economy for a 
common currency area with the regional neighbors. Since regional shocks, by 
construction, affect the economies in the region in a similar way, the importance of 
regional shocks implies that the local economy is dominated by symmetric shocks – 
shocks that affect the economies in the same region in a similar manner.5  
The three structural shocks may mix various underlying shocks. Transitory global 
shocks that have no long-run effect on global output could be classified as regional or 
local shocks. Similarly, transitory regional shocks may be classified as local. It does not 
matter if we classify a shock as “regional” “global” or “country-specific.” What we try to 
                                               
4 Blanchard and Quah (1989) originally develop a two-variable version of this identification method based 
on long-run restrictions. We employ the method since long-run restrictions allow freer estimation of short-
run interactions and thus appear less restrictive than the identification methods that rely on 
contemporaneous relationships. The zero restriction employed here has a natural interpretation of the small 
economy assumption which is one of the most widely used assumptions in open-economy macroeconomic 
modeling.  
5 Thus the economy that has a high importance of regional shocks can be considered to pass the Mundell’s 
test of OCA. We also expect regional shocks to be more important in a more open economy. The criterion 
thus incorporates the McKinnon’s test of OCA as well. 
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investigate is whether outputs of individual countries move together as a result of the 
three shocks and how important they are relative to each other.  
In a related study, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) apply the aggregate demand-
aggregate supply model. They maintain that demand disturbances reflect macroeconomic 
policy choices of the country including exchange rate policy and thus are not expected to 
be invariant with respect to the exchange rate regime. On the other hand, supply shocks 
are considered to be more structural and thus less sensitive to the choice of an exchange 
rate arrangement. If supply shocks across countries show high (low) correlations within 
the region, then the region would be a good (poor) candidate for a currency union.  
One difficulty of the Bayoumi and Eichengreen model is that when supply shocks are 
correlated across countries, it cannot distinguish whether shocks are regional, global, or 
simply correlated local shocks. The prevalence of regional shocks or correlated local 
shocks may justify common monetary policy within the region. On the other hand, if 
global shocks are dominant and if they similarly affect all economies inside and outside 
the region, a more global arrangement might be necessary. Another problem is the 
assumption that supply shocks tend to be invariant with respect to changes in exchange 
rate regimes. Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that countries are likely to face more similar 
shocks as trade between them increases, implying that supply shocks will become more 
highly correlated as economic integration progresses. As a common currency reinforces 
and is reinforced by trade interdependence within the region, supply shocks are expected 
to become more correlated over time.6  
 
2.4 Empirical results 
Output is represented by valued-added industrial production (in constant 2000 US 
dollar). We choose 12 countries in the CFA franc zone. Chad and Equatorial Guinea are 
excluded due to inadequate data. In the benchmark model, we define regional output as 
the trade-weighted average of France and 3 major trade partners from the CFA franc 
zone. Global output is defined as the trade-weighted average of outputs of the US, Japan 
and 4 major trading partners (other than France) from the European Union. The weights 
                                               
6 Note that a similar critique applies to our model as well. For instance, increases in intra-regional trade are 
likely to increase the role of regional shocks relative to country-specific shocks. The moral is that no single 
classification scheme is optimal for all purposes and one needs to investigate various models. 
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are based on the sum of exports from and imports to each CFA country. For comparison, 
we also choose 10 EMU countries − Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Spain − and 5 non-EMU countries − Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.7 Data for the CFA countries are derived from World 
Development Index (World Bank). Those for the EMU and other developed countries are 
retrieved from the International Financial Statistics website (IMF). Both data are annual 
for 1970 to 2004. The trade weights are based on exports and imports data for 1990 to 
1992 and obtained from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF).  
Table 2.1 reports the results of unit root and cointegration tests. Both the augmented 
Dickey Fuller (DF) tests and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test are used with 4 lags. 
Y-G, Y-R, and Y-D denote global, regional, and country-specific output, respectively. 
The results indicate that the presence of unit roots is not rejected for most variables in 
most countries. In a small number of exceptional cases such as the DF unit root test for 
domestic industrial production in Niger, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at the 5 
percent significance level. Cointegration tests based on the method proposed by Engle 
and Granger (1987) suggest that the null of non-cointegration of global, regional, and 
local outputs could not be rejected. We thus proceed with the assumption that all 
variables are nonstationary and noncointegrated with each other. The reduced-form 
model thus consists of first differences of the variables and does not contain the error-
correction term. 
Table 2.2 reports the variance decomposition of forecast errors at the 2- and 10-year 
forecast horizons for the European countries. Global, regional and local shocks are 
denoted by “U-G”, “U-R” and “U-D”, respectively. 2 (10) year responses are taken as 
short-term (long-term) effects. In all cases, the VAR model is estimated with 2 lags 
(which is optimal by lag length test). Variance decompositions are reported only for 
domestic output since both global and regional outputs are mainly explained by global 
and regional shocks, respectively. European countries are grouped into EMU and non-
EMU countries.  
                                               
7 Belgium and Luxembourg are excluded due to data insufficiency. Regional output is defined as 
the trade-weighted average of 4 major trading partners within European Union. Global outputs 
are the trade-weighted average of the US and Japan. 
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In the EMU group, regional shocks are dominant in most countries. More than 40 
percent of short-term and long-term output variations in domestic output are due to 
regional shocks. The importance of regional shocks is highest in Austria, France and 
Spain where they explain 60 percent or more of output variations in the short run and 
more than 50 percent in the long run. For those countries, the roles of global shocks seem 
minimal, explaining less than 20 percent in the long run in most cases. Finland, Ireland 
and Italy appear exceptions in this group where country-specific shocks are dominant and 
explain more than 70 percent of short-run and long-run fluctuations in output while 
regional shock explain 20 percent or less.  
In the non-EMU countries, in sharp contrast, country-specific shocks are dominant 
over regional and global shocks. Regional shocks are much less important than for the 
EMU countries. With the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, regional shocks explain 
no more than 20 percent of output variations in the short-run and no more than 35 percent 
in the long-run. 
Among the countries that joined the EMU, it had been known that the three countries − 
Finland, Ireland and Italy − might be less suitable than the others for various reasons. For 
instance, Finland’s natural resource-rich economy or Ireland’s dynamic growth was not 
considered to mix well with other countries within the single currency area. Interestingly, 
France, which is often considered too large to belong in a currency area with Germany, 
shows dominant regional effects both in the short run and in the long run. Among the 
non-EMU countries, it is well known that Switzerland has maintained a stable exchange 
rate against the German mark and, accordingly, monetary policy consistent with it. These 
suggest that, while applying absolute criteria based on the theory of OCA is difficult, the 
model employed here provides a sensible ranking of countries which can be used as an 
index of suitability to joining in a single currency area.  
Table 2.3 reports variance decompositions for the CFA franc zone countries. 
Dominant shocks for domestic output are country-specific in all countries except 
Cameroon and, in both horizons, explain more than 50 percent in almost all cases. 
Regional shocks are far less important than in the EMU group reported in Table 2.2, 
explaining less than 10 percent of output variations in most CFA franc zone countries. 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali are somewhat exceptional in that regional shocks 
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show stronger effects on their economies than other countries in the monetary union. 
Regional shocks explain up to 57 percent of output variation in the short-run and 39 
percent in the long-run in these three countries, which are a bit smaller but still 
comparable to those observed in the core of EMU countries.  
The results are surprising. Given that all CFA countries in the sample have maintained 
a common currency 50 years or longer with the exception of Guinea-Bissau (joined in 
1997) and Mali (exited from the CFA franc zone during 1962-84), one would have 
expected that, by now, they are similar and therefore common or regional shocks are 
dominant. One can find a clue to the question in Tables 1A and 2A in the appendix which 
shows the main export items of the CFA franc zone countries. In all countries with no 
exception, international trade and production consist of commodities such as cotton, 
mineral ores, and petroleum. The manufacturing sector takes less than 10 percent of the 
whole economy. Although openness as measured by the export/GDP ratio is high, 
reaching over 50 percent in many cases, the ratio has little changed or even declined as a 
result of trade growth slower than the growth of national output itself.  
Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002) find that belonging to a currency 
union/board triples trade with other currency union members. In an earlier work, Frankel 
and Rose (1998) also report that business cycle correlation increases when countries trade 
more with each other. Our results suggest that the hypothesis that a common currency 
would promote international trade and international business cycle correlation may not 
hold for countries that specialize in commodities. 
 
2.5 Robustness 
Whether a shock can be classified “regional” or any other type depends on the 
identifying scheme. There are some elements of arbitrariness in defining regional and 
global outputs. In this section, therefore, we try various definitions of regional and global 
outputs for the identification of structural shocks. For the first alternative model, M1, we 
define regional output as the weighted average of outputs of three leading CFA franc 
zone countries only. French output is used as a proxy for global output.  In M2, regional 
output is represented by a weighted average of three leading trade partners in the CFA 
franc zone and four from the European Union. Global output is the weighted average of 
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US and Japanese outputs. For M1 and M2, the weights are based on the sum of exports 
from and import to CFA franc zone countries from 1990 to 1992. In M3, we define 
regional output as the weighted average of France and 3 major CFA franc zone countries. 
Global output consists of the US, Japan and four EU countries. The difference between 
the benchmark model and M3 is that the 3 CFA countries are chosen and assigned 
weights based on bilateral trade for BM and the economic size for M3.  
Table 2.4 shows that the results vary little under these various alternative 
specifications. In M1 and M2, the roles of regional shocks are uniformly lower in all 
cases than the benchmark case with the only exception of Niger for M1. Even though M2 
has a much wider coverage of countries as “regional,” no country shows a significant 
increase in the role of regional shocks. Reflecting the similarity between the BM and M3, 
the variance decompositions are hardly changed. The results thus seem fairly robust to 
the way the regional economy is defined. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we operationalize the theory of optimum currency area with a model in 
which national output is determined by three types of shocks: global, regional, and 
country-specific. In this model, the relative role of regional shocks is taken as an 
indicator of suitability for a common currency area with the regional neighbors. 
Summarizing the main results of the study: in European countries, we find that regional 
shocks tend to be more dominant in EMU countries than in non-EMU countries. A 
careful examination of and the main results and exceptional cases reveals that the model 
generates a sensible ordering of countries in terms of their OCA “fitness.” This supports 
the validity of the criterion employed in this study. When applied to the CFA franc zone, 
we find, in sharp contrast to the EMU group, dominant shocks are country-specific and 
regional shocks are far less important in most cases. Variations with the definitions of 
regional and global outputs produce make no qualitative differences.  
Implications are significant. Having a common currency can deliver a low inflation 
environment when it is firmly pegged to a strong anchor currency. However, the case of 
CFA franc zone shows clearly that one should not expect more than that. Economic 
growth in the zone has been mediocre and heavily dependent on external shocks such as 
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wide variations in the terms of trade. International trade has not grown any faster than 
countries outside the union, intraregional trade still remains a small portion and nearly 
half of the countries remain the poorest in the world. Notwithstanding the remarkable 
longevity of the monetary union, we find in this paper that there is little convergence in 
the similarity of economic structure among the members. It suggests that the monetary 
union in the CFA franc zone should have been costly to maintain. 
According to our results, the CFA franc zone may not conform to the OCA criteria. 
However, the fact that the currency union exists more than 50 years could attribute to the 
CFA franc zone’s distinctive characteristic from its ties with France historically and 
economically. It is argued that the CFA franc zone is unique in postcolonial Africa in that 
France continues to exert considerable influence in its ex-colonies, and the latter in some 
sense have not gained full sovereignty as other countries colonized by other European 
powers. The CFA franc zone is treated as a set of instruments developed by France to 
regulate and shape economic relations with its ex-colonies. By the early 1970s, it was 
alleged that maintaining a currency link defined by the French Treasury perpetuates 
French neocolonialism, benefiting the French economy much more than the economies of 
the member states and it was argued that the conservative and monetarist rules did not 
adequately promote economic growth. As the African crisis has worsened in 1983, 
however the implicit critique of the French ‘neocolonialism’ has turned into something 
akin to praise for France’s willingness to remain involved in Africa partly because the 
CFA franc zone seemed to have been somewhat sheltered from the economic crisis 
hitting the rest of the continent. Pegging to a single currency has been the option most 
favored by less developed countries at that time. In the early 1980s, the CFA franc zone 
was a ‘zone of solidarity’ and served as a potential model for relations between the 
developed north and developing countries in the south.  
On the other hand, France’s undeniable commitment to the CFA franc zone does not 
appear to have a distinctive impact on the economies of the member states. Economic 
comparisons between the CFA franc zone countries and the rest of Africa found few 
significant differences except a slightly larger tertiary sector, lower inflation and a more 
open trading regime in the franc zone.  As the situation worsened considerably after  
1985, countries in the CFA franc zone avoided adjustment and continued to live beyond 
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their means and accumulate debt while other African countries gave in to IMF pressures 
and exerted stringent fiscal and monetary discipline to adjust to changes in the 
international environment. In 1988 and 1989, the CFA franc zone as a whole experienced 
a double digit negative growth. Both operations accounts of CFA franc zone countries in 
French Treasury were rapidly accumulating deficits, putting a tremendous pressure on the 
French Treasury.  
In 1994, France pushed for a devaluation of the CFA franc, but maintained its 
convertibility and most of the current structure. In brief, there might be many different 
factors that can explain why African states choose to remain in the CFA franc zone. The 
unlimited convertibility guarantee from the French Treasury is one of the necessary 
ingredients of the long-lasting arrangement in Africa. However, France may reconsider 
the conditions for its support when the cost of maintaining the CFA franc zone increases. 
How long will the CFA franc zone last in the future? Ironically, the member African 
states will probably not weigh that heavily in this decision as it will be made in France. 
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Table 2.1 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
  Unit Root Tests   
Cointegration  
Tests  
 Y-G  Y-R  Y-D  
 DF PP  DF PP  DF PP  
Benin -0.25 -1.31   -2.64 -2.70   0.71 0.13   -2.26 
Burkina Faso -0.81 -1.66  -2.04 -2.31  -0.82 -1.14  -2.95 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.30 -1.53  -2.08 -2.47  -2.77 -2.48  -2.50 
Guinea-Bissau -1.42 -2.23  -2.82 -2.69  -1.39 -1.91  -2.09 
Mali -0.51 -1.45  -2.85 -2.74  1.42 1.06  -1.85 
Niger -1.80 -2.18  -2.21 -2.56  -3.73 -2.68  -4.11 
Senegal -0.77 -1.68  -2.86 -2.68  1.58 1.62  -1.71 
Togo -0.50 -1.56  -2.81 -2.73  -1.13 -1.80  -2.13 
Cameroon -0.36 -1.55  -1.59 -2.44  -2.51 -1.71  -4.21 
Cent African Rep -1.26 -1.93  -2.34 -1.92  -0.29 -1.41  -2.13 
Chad -0.71 -1.37  -2.79 -2.71  0.47 -0.49  -3.74 
Rep of Congo -0.10 -1.07   -1.19 -2.36   -2.26 -2.56   -4.09 
           
Europe           
Austria -1.30 -1.68  -0.15 -1.00  2.20 0.19  -2.28 
Finland -0.75 -1.32  -0.24 -1.27  0.77 -0.16  -2.35 
France -0.37 -1.07  -0.32 -1.25  -1.13 -2.87  -1.86 
Germany -0.84 -1.37  -0.78 -2.39  0.10 -0.53  -3.05 
Greece -1.45 -1.78  -0.47 -1.56  -2.44 -6.58  -2.04 
Ireland -0.20 -0.95  -0.40 -1.26  0.75 1.78  -2.14 
Italy -0.29 -1.01  -0.26 -1.45  -1.29 -2.14  -3.25 
Netherlands -0.32 -1.03  -0.27 -1.17  -0.07 -1.82  -2.18 
Portugal -0.75 -1.31  -0.43 -1.37  -2.42 -3.64  -2.62 
Spain -0.53 -1.17  -0.56 -1.79  -0.32 -2.86  -2.35 
Denmark -0.95 -1.45  -0.18 -1.19  -0.35 -0.72  -2.26 
Norway -0.55 -1.18  -0.26 -1.32  -1.77 -2.59  -2.41 
Sweden -0.40 -1.08  -0.23 -1.29  0.80 0.10  -2.44 
Switzerland -0.75 -1.31  -0.32 -1.34  0.77 0.08  -2.72 
United Kingdom -0.28 -1.00  -0.35 -1.71  -0.68 -0.99  -3.06 
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Table 2.2 Variance Decompositions for Europe 
  Forecast 
Horizon 
  Y-D   
  U-G U-R U-D 
EMU Countries 
Austria 2 23.5 70.6 5.9 
 10 20.8 55.6 23.6 
     
Finland 2 5.3 16.5 78.3 
 10 6.4 23.8 69.8 
     
France 2 8.4 70.5 21.1 
 10 13.4 66.4 20.2 
     
Germany 2 9.3 44.4 46.3 
 10 8.7 45.8 45.5 
     
Greece 2 24.3 41.7 34.0 
 10 23.8 41.1 35.1 
     
Ireland 2 7.2 9.8 83.0 
 10 6.3 19.1 74.6 
     
Italy 2 12.4 4.5 83.1 
 10 14.6 11.2 74.3 
     
Netherlands 2 6.9 31.2 61.8 
 10 7.6 31.5 60.8 
     
Portugal 2 2.2 49.7 48.1 
 10 3.5 49.2 47.3 
     
Spain 2 16.0 63.9 20.1 
 10 13.7 54.4 31.9 
Non-EMU Countries 
Denmark 2 24.5 18.3 57.2 
 10 20.5 32.0 47.5 
     
Norway 2 27.9 16.4 55.7 
 10 35.3 16.2 48.6 
     
Sweden 2 10.7 48.3 41.0 
 10 15.7 43.2 41.1 
     
Switzerland  2 25.2 23.8 51.0 
 10 26.2 32.6 41.2 
     
UK 2 57.7 18.4 23.9 
  10 57.2 19.7 23.0 
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Table 2.3 Variance Decompositions for the CFA franc zone 
 
Years 
 Y-D    
  U-G U-R U-D 
     
Benin 2 42.2 6.7 51.1 
 10 47.3 6.8 45.9 
     
Burkina Faso 2 14.3 0.2 85.6 
 10 23.8 2.4 73.8 
     
Cote d'Ivoire 2 8.8 37.5 53.8 
 10 11.8 36.4 51.8 
     
Guinea-Bissau 2 6.5 13.3 80.3 
 10 15.5 25.7 58.8 
     
Mali 2 0.6 37.9 61.5 
 10 4.5 39.0 56.5 
     
Niger 2 18.0 2.0 80.0 
 10 17.5 2.0 80.5 
     
Senegal 2 1.3 8.3 90.3 
 10 3.2 8.7 88.1 
     
Togo 2 17.6 10.2 72.2 
 10 21.9 10.2 67.9 
     
Cameroon 2 27.9 56.9 15.2 
 10 35.5 37.6 26.8 
     
Cent Afr Rep 2 7.0 18.9 74.1 
 10 18.7 16.3 64.9 
     
Chad 2 1.7 2.0 96.2 
 10 5.4 2.4 92.2 
     
Rep of Congo 2 24.5 5.0 70.5 
 10 31.2 6.3 62.4 
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Table 2.4 Variance Decompositions in Alternative Models for the CFA franc zone 
    BM   M1   M2   M3 
    (2) (10)   (2) (10)   (2) (10)   (2) (10) 
             
Benin U-R 6.7 6.8  17.6 18.5  6.8 7.3  4.7 5.2 
 U-D 51.1 45.9  76.0 73.0  41.4 38.0  52.6 47.1 
             
Burkina Faso U-R 0.2 2.4  3.4 6.2  2.1 5.9  0.7 1.4 
 U-D 85.6 73.8  96.5 90.0  85.8 74.9  85.3 73.8 
             
Cote d'Ivoire U-R 37.5 36.4  7.0 7.3  5.8 6.9  16.6 17.8 
 U-D 53.8 51.8  50.4 51.2  52.5 49.0  53.7 49.9 
             
Guinea-Bissau U-R 13.3 25.7  16.8 22.1  9.3 21.5  15.1 26.9 
 U-D 80.3 58.8  78.9 65.7  84.6 67.9  80.0 59.4 
             
Mali U-R 37.9 39.0  12.3 12.2  41.6 44.6  39.6 40.5 
 U-D 61.5 56.5  69.3 63.4  53.4 50.1  60.2 55.8 
             
Niger U-R 2.0 2.0  32.5 29.3  1.2 1.4  1.9 1.9 
 U-D 80.0 80.5  58.9 62.6  73.2 74.0  80.0 80.5 
             
Senegal U-R 8.3 8.7  7.5 8.5  9.2 10.2  8.3 8.6 
 U-D 90.3 88.1  91.8 90.0  88.1 84.7  90.4 88.3 
             
Togo U-R 10.2 10.2  0.7 1.9  1.7 1.9  10.1 10.1 
 U-D 72.2 67.9  98.4 97.1  88.7 83.4  72.6 68.3 
             
Cameroon U-R 56.9 37.6  27.5 35.8  3.4 3.4  51.7 34.6 
 U-D 15.2 26.8  71.4 62.4  92.4 94.0  21.0 32.0 
             
Cent Afr Rep  U-R 18.9 16.3  7.2 7.7  23.0 20.1  24.6 22.0 
 U-D 74.1 64.9  70.6 69.7  72.1 66.2  65.7 59.5 
             
Chad U-R 2.0 2.4  14.8 16.4  2.0 2.0  0.2 1.4 
 U-D 96.2 92.2  76.5 66.2  95.9 94.3  98.8 95.4 
             
Rep of  Congo U-R 5.0 6.3  0.6 5.3  2.2 7.6  4.2 5.6 
 U-D 70.5 62.4  97.0 91.1  62.2 56.7  71.7 63.4 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Basic Statistics for the CFA franc zone countries 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005, World Bank) 
GNI: the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes(less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus 
net receipt of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.  
PPP GNI: GNI converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. [An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GNI as a US dollar has in the United States.] 
Under the structure of output, the two numbers are for agriculture (including forestry and fishing) and manufacturing. The remainder are 
services, mining, construction, and utilities.   
a. For 1990. 
b. Population data for all countries and all data for Equatorial Guinea are obtained from Country Information page of CIA 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ek.html for 2005.  
 Pop GNI pc / 
PPP GNI pc 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Structure 
of Output 
Growth of 
M’dise 
Exports 
Inflation 
(GDP 
Deflator) 
Goods 
Exports / 
GDP (%) 
Growth in real 
Trade – Growth 
in real GDP 
 2006 
(mil) 
2003 (US$) ’80-90 / 
’90-03 
2003 ’80-90 / 
’90-02 
’80-90 / 
’90-03 
2003 ‘90-03 
Benin 7.76 440 / 1110 2.5 / 5.0 36  8 0.8 / 2.4 1.7 / 7.0 37.4 -2.6 
Burkina Faso 13.90 300 / 1170 3.6 / 4.2 31  13 11.3 / 10.0 3.3 / 4.7 28.0 -2.0 
Cameroon 17.34 630 / 1990 3.4 / 2.7 44  9 2.1 / 0.3 5.6 / 4.3 36.6 2.2 
Cent Afr Rep 4.30 260 / 1080 1.4 / 1.8 48  11a 16.9 / 2.4 7.9 / 3.9 20.4 -- 
Chad  9.94 260 / 1080 6.1 / 3.1 46  12 -0.2 / 1.5 1.4 / 6.7 42.6 3.8 
Congo, Rep  4.70 650 / 730 3.3 / 1.8 6  6 5.6 / 7.7 0.5 / 7.9 19.4 2.7 
Cote d’Ivoire 17.66 5370 / 10610 0.7 / 2.4 26  11 4.5 / 5.3 2.8 / 7.3 75.3 0.1 
Equatorial Guinea  0.54 14153 / 50200       
Gabon  1.42 3340 / 5500 0.9 / 2.3 8  5 2.1 / 0.6 1.8 / 5.1 59.7 -1.6 
Guinea-Bissau 1.44 140 / 680 4.0 / 0.4 69  10 13.1 / 12.2 57.4 / 22.8 87.6 4.0 
Mali 11.72 187 / 960 0.8 / 4.9 38  3 11.1 / 7.6 4.5 / 6.0 50.4 2.2 
Niger 12.53 197 / 830 -0.1 / 2.8 40  7 3.1 / 0.0 1.9 / 5.2 32.6 -- 
Senegal  11.99 540 / 1620 3.1 / 4.0 17  13 9.8 / 3.6 6.5 / 3.8 56.9 -0.9 
Togo  5.55 310 / 1640 1.7 / 3.1 41  9 7.1 / 5.3 4.8 / 5.4 57.3 -1.5 
World  5510 / 8190 3.3 / 2.8 4  18   41.5 -- 
Low Income  440 / 4877 4.4 / 4.7 24  14   34.9 -- 
2
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Table 2.6 Major Export Items for the CFA franc zone countries 
(Based on 2004 exports) 
 
Benin cotton, crude oil, palm products, cocoa 
Burkina Faso cotton, livestock, gold 
Cameroon crude oil and petroleum products, lumber, cocoa beans, aluminum, coffee, cotton 
Cent Afr Rep diamonds, timber, cotton, coffee, tobacco 
Chad  cotton, cattle, gum arabic, oil 
Congo, Rep  petroleum, lumber, plywood, sugar, cocoa, coffee, diamonds 
Cote d’Ivoire cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, fish 
Equatorial 
Guinea  
petroleum, methanol, timber, cocoa 
Gabon  crude oil, timber, manganese, uranium (2001) 
Guinea-Bissau cashew nuts, shrimp, peanuts, palm kernels, sawn lumber 
Mali cotton, gold, livestock 
Niger uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions 
Senegal  fish, groundnuts (peanuts), petroleum products, phosphates, cotton 
Togo  cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (latest version) 
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Chapter Three 
A Test of Optimal Currency Area for ECCU 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The establishment of European Monetary Union has renewed interest in currency 
unions and their effects. Fidrmuc and Horhonen (2006) examined the impact of exchange 
rate regimes on the magnitude of business cycle correlations. Engel and Rogers (2001) 
focused on the impact of the persistence of asymmetric shocks and Aggarwal and 
Simmons (2005) tested the persistence of deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Overall, there appears to be some evidence that sharing a common currency or adopting a 
hard exchange rate peg reduces international transaction costs and exchange rate risks, 
and promotes greater trade and hence business cycle synchronicity. This paper 
characterizes the nature of structural shocks affecting the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Union (ECCU) and other non-ECCU Caribbean countries. In particular, we are interested 
in measuring the extent of symmetry or asymmetry in the shocks affecting the economies 
in the region. 
Being one of the long-lasting currency unions in the world, the ECCU has been 
questioned about its rationale since its conception because of its small size of 
membership and geographical isolation of the member economies. Mundell (1961) and 
McKinnon (1963) argued that fixed exchange rates could be appropriate for a group of 
economies under certain conditions, which have been formulated into a set of optimum 
currency area (OCA) criteria.8 In this paper, we explore the features of the East 
Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and compare it with other currency union such as the 
CFA franc zone and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. 
In this paper, we operationalize the theory of OCA with a model in which gross 
domestic product is determined by two types of shocks: regional and domestic shocks. 
The relative role of regional shocks is taken as the key indicator of suitability for a 
country to join a common currency union. We investigate the features of those shocks for 
8 ECCU members and 8 non-ECCU Caribbean countries along with 13 CFA franc zone 
                                               
8 The Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria includes: openness to the area members (McKinnon, 1963), 
symmetry of shocks affecting the area members (Mundell, 1961), and well-diversified economies (Kenen, 
1969). In addition, similarity of preferences over output-inflation tradeoffs and willingness to coordinate 
supporting policies such as fiscal transfers contribute to its smooth functioning. 
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countries, 9 EMU countries and 5 non-EMU European countries. We find that domestic 
outputs of the ECCU and EMU countries are strongly influenced by regional shocks 
while country-specific shocks are far more important in the CFA franc zone countries. In 
non-ECCU CARICOM countries and non-EMU European countries, the regional shocks 
and country-specific shocks have nearly equal importance explaining output fluctuations. 
 The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the economic 
integration in the Caribbean Basin area and provides some background information. 
Section 3.3 describes the model and discusses the estimation method. A 2-variable vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model is estimated to investigate the extent of symmetry in 
structural shocks affecting the economies. Section 3.4 reports the estimation results. 
Section 3.5 examines the robustness of the model and section 3.6 provides concluding 
remarks.  
 
3.2 Economic integration in the Caribbean Basin: Background information 
The Caribbean has long been considered a strategically important region based on its 
proximity and unique geographic features. The Caribbean region is mainly a chain of 
islands surrounding the Caribbean Sea. To the north is the Caribbean Sea bordered by the 
Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and the Northern Atlantic Ocean. Straddling the 
divide between North and South America and to the east of Central America, the 
Caribbean is home to important sea-lanes, raw materials, trade and investment 
opportunities, and has been the first line of defense against the encroachment of the 
foreign powers.9 Politically, the term “Caribbean” may be centered around socio-
economic groupings found in the region. All islands in the Caribbean at some point were, 
and a few still are, colonies of European nations. And a few are overseas or dependent 
territories.10 In this paper, we focus on the members in the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and the eight countries which have adopted the East Caribbean dollar as 
their formal currency (ECCU countries) and investigate the rationality for the existence 
of the East Caribbean Currency Union.  
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established on August 1, 1973 by the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas and comprises a group of 12 island and 3 larger coastal nations in 
                                               
9 See Figure 3.1 for the map of Caribbean. 
10 See Table 3.1 for details.  
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and around the Caribbean Sea.11 The majority of the members are very small and all 
members are classified by international organizations as developing countries. The 
CARICOM made special and differential treatment to some members by designating its 
members as less developed countries (LDCs) and more developed countries (MDCs).12 In 
1981, eight members of CARICOM plus British Virgin Islands established the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean states (OECS) with the Treaty of Basseterre.13 Two 
years later they replaced the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority by setting up the 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union 
(ECCU) was formally formed. Eight of the nine members of OECS14 share a common 
currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar, which has been pegged to US dollar at US$1 = 
EC$2.7 since 1976. (It was pegged to the British pound at £1 = EC$4.80 from 1950 to 
1976) In order to deepen economic integration and advance beyond a custom union, the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) was implemented on January 1, 2006 
with the signing of the document for its implementation by six original member states15. 
As of July 3, 2006, it has 12 members.  CSME is expected to be fully implemented by 
2008 and the fulfillment of its goal is likely to require the harmonization of economic 
policy and possibly a single currency.  
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 list vital statistics of the CARICOM members. Two aspects of 
the ECCU economies stand out – their very small size and similar colonial background. 
The ECCU is a very small economy even taken as a whole. The population (in 2008) 
ranges from 9,636 in Montserrat to 172,884 in Saint Lucia and the size ranges from 102 
                                               
11 The 12 island nations are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad 
and Tobago; 3 coastal nations are: Belize, Guyana and Suriname.  
12 The CARICOM Secretariat distinguishes between LDCs and MDCs as that the LDCs includes: Antigua 
and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines; WDCs includes: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
13 Following the collapse of the West Indies Federation, and prior to the signing of the Treaty of Basseterre, 
two caretaker bodies were created: the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers (WISA) in 1966 
and the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) in 1968. 
14 Six of the states using the Eastern Caribbean dollar are independent states: Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and Grenadines. The other two 
are British overseas territories: Anguilla and Montserrat. The only OECS member state not using the 
Eastern Caribbean dollar is British Virgin Islands, which uses the U.S. dollar. 
15 The first six to implement the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) were Barbados, Belize, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and Grenadines were the next batch of members that joined the CSME 
on July 3, 2006.  
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sq. km in Anguilla and Montserrat to 754 sq. km in Dominica. The total population of the 
ECCU is approximately half a million. It is smaller than any one of Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The small market size of the ECCU limits opportunity 
for economies of scale, competition, and diversification of production and trade.  The 
English-speaking ECCU members also share a common colonial background in that they 
were all British colonial territories before their independence were governed. Most 
ECCU countries gradually became politically independent and are able to pursue 
independent economic policies since late 1970s. Most non-ECCU CARICOM members 
became independent in the 1960s.  
The ECCU members, although all small, exhibit interesting diversity in their major 
economic indicators16. For the independent ECCU countries, GDP (in PPP measure) 
ranges from $485 million in Dominica to $1,189 million in Antigua and Barbuda. Per 
capita GDP (PPP) ranges from $3,600 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines to $10,900 in 
Antigua and Barbuda in 2008. Real growth rate in GDP ranges from 0.9% in Grenada to 
6% in St. Kitts and Nevis. Non-ECCU Caribbean countries share higher GDP (PPP) and 
per capita GDP (PPP) figures. Most of them have per capita GDP over $5,000 in 2008 
and maintain a GDP growth rate higher than 3 percent. Except Haiti, most non-ECCU 
Caribbean countries also have lower unemployment rates and higher inflation rates than 
the ECCU countries in 2008. The ECCU members share a common currency − the East 
Caribbean dollar − while other non-ECCU members have their own currencies.  
Until 1950s, the East Caribbean countries were overwhelmingly agricultural and 
mainly specializing in either bananas or sugar. The major industry in Caribbean has been 
steadily shifted from agriculture to tourism through the 1980s. The Caribbean countries 
have attributed their income increase to the change to tourism industry. Nowadays, 
tourism accounts a higher role than agriculture in most Caribbean countries17.  
The CARICOM countries inherited narrow production structures from their colonial 
economic heritage. As captive producers and consumers for the European states, 
Caribbean economies were developed to complement their counterparts across the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Spawned by foreign investment and sustained by protected trade, 
plantation economies arose largely based on sugar and banana. Minerals extraction and 
                                               
16 See Table 3.2 for details. 
17 See Table 3.5 for details. 
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tourism came along much later18. The former colonies were dependent on European 
imports for manufactured goods and food. The relationship endured for centuries and 
carried forward into the post-independence period. Overall, the Caribbean trade regime 
remained relatively undiversified, sheltered from competition, and poorly linked to 
domestic food and manufacturing production.  
The regional export and import as percentage to exports to and imports from the world 
market for CARICOM member is reported in table 3.8. The CARICOM trade patterns are 
evolving. For the ECCU countries, the exports within the ECCU increased from the 1980 
to 2000. This trend stopped in 2006 when the intraregional export ratio had a decline to 
9.6 percent.  The intraregional imports of ECCU countries have been low since the 1980s 
and intraregional imports ratios counted less than 5 percent of total imports during the 
period 1980-2006. The intraregional exports ratios of non-ECCU CARICOM countries 
are typically less than 2 percent since 1980s. Intraregional imports ratios of non-ECCU 
CARICOM countries have slightly increased from 5.6 percent in 1980 to 6.8 percent in 
2006. For all CARICOM countries, exports and imports within the region have stagnated 
across the decades. Particularly, the trade preference of the ECCU countries is with EU 
countries and the trade preference of the non-ECCU countries is with the United States. 
Significant changes in trade patterns have occurred as trade with EU and the United 
States declines and trade with Asia has significantly increases since 2000. The potential 
reason behind these changes may be caused by the fact that unilateral preferences with 
the EU are being replaced by a reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), while 
the relative benefit of unilateral trade preferences with the United States continues to 
erode as multilateral liberalization and U.S. reciprocal trade agreements, beginning with 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Intraregional CARICOM 
trade shows little promise for growth. It appears that Asia will be emerging as 
increasingly important trade partners in the future.  
 
3.3 Model 
We employ a simplified version of the model first developed by Chow and Kim 
(2003). In their original model, domestic output, yd, is assumed to be affected by three 
                                               
18 See Table 3.6, Table 3.7 for details. 
 
28 
 
kinds of shocks - global shock, regional shock and country-specific shock ( , and 
).    
 
 
where ...)( 33
2
210 ++++= LLLL iiiii βββββ  is a polynomial function of the lag 
operator L. ,gtu
r
tu and 
d
tu  represent the zero-mean mutually uncorrelated global shocks, 
regional and country-specific shocks, respectively. Global shocks can affect the 
economies both inside and outside the regional boundary such as world oil crises in 
1970s. Regional shocks are common to the economies within the region. Regional shocks 
will not have persistent effect on global economy. Country-specific shocks are unique to 
a particular economy. They may be either from aggregate supply shocks on productivity 
or the terms of trade or from aggregate demand shocks associated with monetary or fiscal 
policies.  
In this paper, we employ a 2-variable structural vector autoregressive model. In our 
model, domestic output, yd, is assumed to be affected by only two kinds of shocks: 
regional and country-specific shocks. Country-specific shocks are defined as the shocks 
that only affect a particular economy for one country. Regional shocks in this paper refer 
to any shocks that affect the economies both inside and outside Caribbean area. In the 
case of the small economies of the ECCU members and other countries in the region, the 
United States plays a dominant role. A great majority of international trade of the small 
economies in the Caribbean is with the United States and European countries. 
Intraregional trade with Caribbean countries is trivial comparing with the trade with the 
United States and European countries. Moreover, the ECCU currency is tied to the US 
dollar. Thus, it is clear that the US economy plays a core of the regional economies. At 
the same time, the US economy is also a main part of the global economy as well. We 
thus combine both regional and global shocks in Chow and Kim (2003) model together 
and call the resulting shocks as regional shocks. They capture all external influences on 
domestic output. 19  
                                               
19 Here the “regional shocks” actually are the shocks from changes in US, Japan and six major European 
trading partners of Caribbean countries. We adopted a 2-variable model because we believe the effect from 
ECCU or non-ECCU CARICOM countries is quite small.  
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In this paper, we shrink the model of Chow and Kim (2003) into a 2 x 2 vector 
autoregressive model. They are related to two structural shocks as follows: 
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where ...)( 2210 +++= LaLaaLA ijijijij  is a matrix of polynomial functions of the lag 
operator L. We assume that the structural shocks are uncorrelated and of unit variance: 
IuVar t =)( . Structural shocks are unobserved and we have one restriction employed to 
recover them from reduced-form innovations: country-specific shocks have no long-run 
effects on regional output. So the economy is considered to be small part of the regional 
economy.  In the coefficient matrix, these imply that: 
0)1(12 =A         where ...)1(
210 +++= ijijijij aaaA  
The restriction implies that the cumulative effect of dtu on 
r
ty∆ is zero, and the shock 
d
tu has only short-run effects on regional output. Note that there is no restriction on the 
effects of a regional shock on country’s domestic output.  
 
3.4 Empirical results 
In this study, output is represented by real Gross Domestic Production (in constant 
2000 US$ and seasonal adjusted). We choose 8 ECCU members20. For comparison, we 
also choose 8 non-ECCU CARICOM members in the same geographical area.21  We 
defined regional output as trade-weighted average of outputs of the United States, Japan 
and 5 major trading partner countries22 from Europe. The weights are based on the -
exports and imports of Caribbean country with each developed country. Real GDP data 
for all the investigated countries are retrieved from WDI (World Development Indicator, 
World Bank) and we use some data from the IFS (International Financial Statistics, IMF) 
to justify and remedy the missing value which we need.  Selected data are annual data 
ranging from 1973 to 2005. To form the regional output proxy, we also retrieve the 
                                               
20 The 8 ECCU members include: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St.Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent and Grenadines, Auguilla and Montserrat. Data for Auguilla starts from 1990.    
21 The 8 non-ECCU Caribbean countries include: the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
22 The 5 leading trade partners include: United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands 
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annual data of exports and imports from 1990 to 1992 for all Caribbean area countries 
with the US, Japan and selected European countries from DOTs (Direction of Trade 
statistics, June 2008).    
Table 3.9 reports the results of unit root tests. We employed the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test, the Schmidt-Phillips (SP) test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) test. The null hypothesis for ADF and the SP tests is that the GDP is non-
stationary. We assume that there is a nonzero mean for each series but there is no time 
trend. We use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to find the optimal lag length for our 
tests. The null hypothesis that GDP is non-stationary cannot be rejected for all 
CARICOM countries with the ADF and SP tests. For KPSS test, the null hypothesis is 
that the outputs are stationary. The results indicate that the null is rejected at the 
conventional significance level. When the same tests are applied to the first differences of 
the series, the unit-root null is rejected with the ADF and SP tests and stationary null is 
not rejected with the KPSS test. The results imply that each output series contains a unit 
root and thus should be first differenced to become stationary. 
We estimate a structural vector autoregressive model for ECCU countries and non-
ECCU CARICOM countries first. We also extend our model to CFA franc zone 
countries, EMU countries and non EMU European countries as well for comparison. The 
results of the forecast error variance decomposition at 2-year and 10-year forecast 
horizon are reported in table 3.10, table 3.11 and table 3.12.  Regional and local shocks 
are denoted by “U-R” and “U-D” respectively. 2(10) year responses are taken as short-
term (long-term) effects. In all cases, the VAR model are estimated with different optimal 
lags (which is determined by lag length tests). Blanchard-Quah variance decompositions 
are reported only for domestic output only since regional output are mainly explained by 
regional shocks itself.  
We see some interesting outcome from the variance decomposition.  ECCU countries 
show a dominant regional shock effect. In Antigua and Barbuda, St.Kitts and Nevis, 
regional shocks explain around 80 percent domestic output fluctuations in the long run 
and regional shocks explain more than 60 percent of domestic output changes in Anguilla 
in both short term and long term. In the rest of ECCU countries, there is a significant 
increase in the role of regional shocks from short term to the long term. In non-ECCU 
CARICOM countries, domestic shocks play a more important role. In Bahamas, 
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Barbados and Belize, domestic shocks explain more than 85 percent domestic output 
fluctuations in the short run. In the long run, there is a large increase in the role of 
regional shocks.  In Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, 
regional shocks can explain more than 40 percent domestic output fluctuations in the long 
term.   
In CFA franc zone countries, dominant shocks for domestic output are country 
domestic shocks except Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. In both horizons, domestic 
shocks explain more than 70 percent in almost all cases. Regional shocks are far less 
important that ECCU countries. For Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, regional shocks 
explain more than 40 percent in the short term and more than 50 percent in the long term 
which are a bit smaller but comparable to those observed in the ECCU countries.  
In the EMU group, regional shocks are dominant in most countries. More than 35 
percent of short-term and 40 percent long-term output variations in domestic output are 
due to regional shocks. The importance of regional shocks is highest in Austria, Greece, 
and Spain where they explain 65 percent or more of output variations in the long term 
and 40 percent or more in the short term. Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherland and Portugal 
seems appear exceptions in the group where country-specific shocks are dominant and 
explain more than 60 percent in both short and long term. In the non-EMU countries, 
however, regional shocks are equivalent to domestic shocks. In Sweden, regional shocks 
explain 93 percent domestic output variations in the short term and 80 percent in the long 
term. In Denmark and UK, regional shocks can explain 50 percent or more of domestic 
output variations.  
One good reason why we find that most ECCB country will have an asymmetric 
regional shock and take advantage to be in this currency union may depend on the 
composition of their trading sector and economic structure.  The fact that typical 
Caribbean country has a tradable sector which consists of tourism, agriculture staple, 
mineral and manufacture of beverages gives us the reason.  The supply of each of them is 
constrained by domestic capacity due to very small economic size while the domestic 
demand absorbs a very small proportion of production. So the effect of changes in 
relative prices on net domestic supply is therefore negligible in the short run.  And in the 
long run the effect of relative price changes should be considered along with other factors 
such as changes in technology, changes in taste and changes in international ownership. 
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The exchange rate instrument is not as important as big economy and these small size 
economies will benefit more from being in a currency union. 
 
3.5 Robustness 
Not until 1983 was the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) established to issue 
the common currency and administer the common reserve pool from ECCU member 
countries. The ECCB created an interbank market in 1986 to enable commercial banks 
with excess reserves at the central bank to make loans to banks with reserve deficiencies 
and established a rediscount window for treasury bills in 1988 as an inducement to 
commercial banks to invest in government securities. In this section, we try to investigate 
the structure of shocks in the period when ECCB was set up and we focus on the period 
from 1983 to 2005.  
Table 3.13 reports the variance decomposition for ECCU and non-ECCU CARICOM 
countries at 2-year and 10-year forecast horizon during the period 1983 to 2005. 
Comparing to our benchmark model, we find for most ECCU countries, the regional 
shocks explain more variations on domestic output. In Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
St.Vincent and the Grenadines, regional shocks explain more than 75 percent domestic 
output fluctuations in both short-term and long term. In St.Kitt and Nevis and St.Lucia, 
60 percent domestic output variations can be explained by regional shocks in the long 
run. For most non-ECCU CARICOM countries, domestic shocks are still dominant in 
explaining domestic output variations in both short-term and long-term. In Guyana, 
domestic shocks explain 91 percent output variations in the short term and 76 percent in 
the long term. In general, the non-ECCU CARICOM members faced more asymmetric 
shocks than ECCU members after the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) was set 
up in 1983.  
  
3.6 Conclusion 
We employ a 2-variable vector autoregressive model in domestic output is determined 
by two types of shocks: regional and domestic. Summarizing the main result from the 
study, we find that domestic outputs of ECCU countries are strongly influenced by 
regional shocks comparing a dominant country-specific shock in CFA franc zone 
countries. The ECCU countries are structurally related to each other and thus more likely 
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to be subject to symmetric shocks. the monetary and exchange arrangements maintained 
by ECCB have served the region well and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union is more 
likely to be an optimal currency area.  
The ECCU countries have taken the lead in efforts to extend the success of monetary 
cooperation to the integration of national money and capital markets. In the meantime, 
the CARICOM committed themselves to progress economic integration in Eastern 
Caribbean by establishing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy recently and 
eventually to the formation of a single, regional, financial space in the area. However, to 
achieve the goal, it requires not only the deepening of the links among the member 
countries but also greater integration of labor and product markets in the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Figure 3.1 Map of the Caribbean Region  
                 
                Source: GraphicMaps.com  
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Table 3.1 Historical Groupings 
Grouping Current territories Former territories 
British West Indies / 
Anglophone Caribbean 
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Danish West Indies  present-day United States Virgin Islands 
Dutch West Indies  present-day Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruda, Virgin Islands, Saint Croix, Tobago 
and Bay Islands 
French West Indies Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin 
and Saint-Barthelemy 
Hispaniola, Dominica, Grenada, The 
Grenadines, Saint Croix, Saint Kitts, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent, Tobago 
Portuguese West Indies  present-day Barbados 
Spanish West Indies  Cuba, Hispaniola (Dominican Republic), 
Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Cayman Islands, 
Trinidad and Bay Islands 
Swedish West Indies   French Saint-Barthelemy and Guadeloupe 
Source: de Kadt (1972), Kurlansky (1992), Develtere (1994), Gowricharn (2006) 
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Table 3.2 Economic Integration in Caribbean 
Countries CARICOM OECS ECCU CSME LDCs WDCs 
Antigua and Barbuda x x x x x 
 
Anguilla 
 
x x 
   
Bahamas x 
     
Barbados x 
  
x 
 
x 
Belize x 
  
x x 
 
British Virgin Islands 
 
x 
    
Dominica x x x x x 
 
Grenada x x x x x 
 
Guyana x 
  
x 
 
x 
Haiti x 
     
Jamaica x 
  
x 
 
x 
Montserrat x x x 
 
x 
 
St. Kitts and Nevis x x x x x 
 
St. Lucia x x x x x 
 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines x x x x x 
 
Suriname x 
  
x 
 
x 
Trinidad and Tobago x     x   x 
Note: x represents the full membership of the relative grouping 
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Table 3.3 Country characteristic variables 
  Total 
population 
Area 
(sq. km) 
Median 
age 
Life 
expectancy 
Languages Literacy Independence 
ECCU members 
Antigua and Barbuda 69,842 443 30.5 72.7 English (official),local dialects 85.8% November 1, 1981 
Dominica 72,514 754 29.4 75.3 English (official), French patois 94.0% November 3, 1978 
Grenada 90,343 344 22.4 65.6 English (official), French patois 96.0% February 7, 1974 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 39,619 261 28.3 72.9 English 97.8% September 19, 1983 
Saint Lucia 172,884 616 26.0 74.3 English (official), French patois 90.1% February 22, 1979 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 118,432 389 28.0 74.3 English (official), French patois 96.0% October 27, 1979 
Anguilla 14,108 102 32.3 80.5 English 95.0% April 1, 1982 
Montserrat 9,638 102 29.7 79.2 English 97.0% December 19, 1989 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
Bahamas 307,451 13,940 28.4 65.7 English, Creole (among Haitian 
immigrants) 
95.6% July 10, 1973 
Barbados 281,968 431 35.4 73.2 English 99.7% November 30, 1966 
Belize 301,270 22,966 20.1 68.2 Spanish, Creole, Mayan dialects, English, 
Garifuna, German, other 
76.9% September 21, 1981 
Guyana 770,794 214,970 28.2 66.4 English, Amerindian dialects, Creole, 
Caribbean Hindustani, Urdu 
98.8% May 26, 1966 
Haiti 8,924,553 27,750 18.5 57.6 French(official), Creole (official) 52.9% January 1, 1804 
Jamaica 2,804,332 10,991 23.4 73.6 English, English patois 87.9% June 6, 1962 
Suriname 475,996 163,270 27.5 73.5 Dutch (official), English,Sranang Tongo, 
Caribbean Hindustani, Javanese  
89.6% November 25, 1975 
Trinidad and Tobago 1,047,366 5,128 32.3 67.0 English (official), Caribbean Hindustani, 
French, Spanish, Chinese 
98.6% August 31, 1962 
Non-ECCU associate CARICOM members 
Bermuda 66,536 53 41.0 78.3 English(official), Portuguese 98.0% June 8, 1968 
British Virgin Islands 24,004 153 32.0 77.1 English 97.8% June 13, 1956 
Cayman Islands 47,862 262 37.8 80.3 English 98.0% January 1, 1959 
Turks and Caicos Islands 22,352 430 27.8 75.2 English 98.0% August 30, 1976 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (July 2008) 
Note: a. Definition of literacy: age 15 and over has ever attended school; b.Auguilla, Montserrat, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands are overseas 
territories of the UK, dates shown are constitution date. 
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Table 3.4 Country economic variables 
  
GDP (PPP) 
(million $) 
GDP - real 
growth rate 
GDP - per 
capita (PPP) 
Unemployment 
rate 
Inflation rate 
(consumer prices) 
Currency (code) 
ECCU members 
Antigua and Barbuda 1,189 3.8% 10,900 11.0% 2.8% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
Dominica 485 3.2% 3,800 23.0% -0.1% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
Grenada 553 0.9% 3,900 12.5% 3.0% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
St. Kitts and Nevis 726 6.0% 8,200 4.5% 8.7% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
St. Lucia 1,179 5.1% 4,800 20.0% 2.9% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 902 4.4% 3,600 15.0% 1.0% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
Anguilla 109 10.2% 8,800 8.0% 5.3% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
Montserrat 29 -1.0% 3,400 6.0% 2.6% East Caribbean dollar (XCD) 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
Bahamas 6,925 2.8% 22,700 7.6% 2.4% Bahamian dollar (BSD) 
Barbados 5,530 4.0% 19,700 10.7% 5.5% Barbadian dollar (BBD) 
Belize 2,336 3.0% 7,800 9.4% 2.8% Belizean dollar (BZD) 
Guyana 4,057 4.5% 5,300 9.1% 10.4% Guyanese dollar (GYD) 
Haiti 15,820 3.5% 1,900 67.0% 8.9% Gourde (HTG) 
Jamaica 13,470 1.5% 4,800 10.2% 7.1% Jamaican dollar (JMD) 
Suriname 3,449 5.1% 7,800 9.5% 9.5% Surinam dollar (SRD) 
Trinidad and Tobago 22,930 5.5% 21,700 6.0% 7.6% Trinidad and Tobago dollar (TTD) 
Non-ECCU associate CARICOM members 
Bermuda 4,500 4.6% 69,900 2.1% 2.8% Bermudian dollar (BMD) 
British Virgin Islands 853 1.0% 38,500 3.6% 2.0% US dollar (USD) 
Cayman Islands 1,939 0.9% 43,800 4.4% 4.4% Caymanian dollar (KYD) 
Turks and Caicos Islands 216 4.9% 11,500 10.0% 4.0% US dollar (USD) 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (July 2008) 
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Table 3.5 Major industries  
ECCU members 
Antigua and Barbuda tourism, construction, light manufacturing (clothing, alcohol, household appiance. 
Dominica soap, coconut oil, tourism, copra, furniture, cement blocks, shoes 
Grenada food and beverages, textiles, light assembly operations, tourism, construction 
Saint Kitts and Nevis tourism, cotton, salt, copra, clothing, footwear, beverages 
Saint Lucia clothing, assembly of electronic components, beverages, corrugated cardboard boxes, tourism, lime 
processing, coconut processing 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines food processing, cement, furniture, clothing, starch 
Anguilla tourism, boat building, offshore financial services 
Montserrat tourism, rum, textiles, electronic appliances 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
Bahamas tourism, banking, cement, oil transshipment, salt, rum, aragonite, pharmaceuticals, spiral-welded 
steel pipe 
Barbados tourism, sugar, light manufacturing, component assembly for export 
Belize garment production, food processing, tourism, construction, oil 
Guyana bauxite, sugar, rice milling, timber, textiles, gold mining 
Haiti sugar refining, flour milling, textiles, cement, light assembly based on imported parts 
Jamaica tourism, bauxite/alumina, agro processing, light manufactures, rum, cement, metal, paper, chemical 
products, telecommunications 
Suriname bauxite and gold mining, alumina production, oil, lumbering, food processing, fishing 
Trinidad and Tobago petroleum, chemicals, tourism, food processing, cement, beverage, cotton textiles 
Non-ECCU associate CARICOM members 
Bermuda international business, tourism, light manufacturing 
British Virgin Islands tourism, light industry, construction, rum, concrete block, offshore financial center 
Cayman Islands tourism, banking, insurance and finance, construction, construction materials, furniture 
Turks and Caicos Islands tourism, offshore financial services 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (July 2008) 
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Table 3.6 Major Trading commodities   
  Exports commodities Imports commodities 
ECCU members   
Antigua and Barbuda petroleum products, bedding, handicrafts, electronic 
components, transport equipment, food and live animals 
food and live animals, machinery and transport equipment, 
manufactures, chemicals, oil 
Dominica bananas, soap, bay oil, vegetables, grapefruit, oranges manufactured goods, machinery and equipment, food, chemicals 
Grenada bananas, cocoa, nutmeg, fruit andvegetables, clothing, 
mace 
food, manufactured goods, machinery, chemicals, fuel 
Saint Kitts and Nevis machinery, food, electronics, beverages, tobacco machinery, manufactures, food, fuels 
Saint Lucia bananas, clothing, cocoa, vegetables, fruits, coconut oil food, manufactured goods, machinery and transportation equipment, 
chemicals, fuels 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines bananas, eddoes and dasheen, arrowroot starch, tennis 
racquets 
foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, chemicals and fertilizers, 
minerals and fuels 
Anguilla lobster, fish, livestock, salt, concrete blocks, rum fuels, foodstuffs, manufactures, chemicals, trucks, textiles 
Montserrat electronic components, plastic bags, apparel, hot peppers, 
limes, live plants, cattle 
machinery and transportation equipment, foodstuffs, manufactured 
goods, fuels, lubricants, and related materials 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members   
Bahamas mineral products and salt, animal products, rum, 
chemicals, fruit and vegetables 
machinery and transport equipment, manufactures, chemicals, 
mineral fuels, food and live animals 
Barbados manufactures, sugar and molasses, rum, other foods and 
beverages, chemicals, electrical components 
consumer goods, machinery, foodstuffs, construction materials, 
chemicals, fuel, electrical components 
Belize sugar, bananas, citrus, clothing, fish products, molasses, 
wood 
machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, fuels, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food, beverages, tobacco 
Guyana sugar, gold, bauxites, alumina, rice, shrimp, molasses, 
rum, timber 
manufactures, machinery, petroleum, food 
Haiti apparel, manufactures, oils, cocoa, mangoes, coffee food, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, 
fuels, raw materials 
Jamaica alumina, bauxite, sugar, bananas, rum, coffee, yams, 
beverages, chemicals, wearing apparel, mineral fuels 
food and other consumer goods, industrial supplies, fuel, parts and 
accessories of capital goods, machinery and transport equipment, 
construction materials 
Suriname alumina, gold, crude oil, lumber, shrimp and fish, rice, 
bananas 
capital equipment, petroleum, foodstuffs, cotton, consumer goods 
Trinidad and Tobago petroleum and petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, 
methanol, ammonia, urea, steel products, beverages, 
cereal and cereal products, sugar, cocoa, coffee, citrus 
fruit, vegetables, flowers 
mineral fuels, lubricants, machinery, transportation equipment, 
manufactured goods, food, live animals, grain 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (July 2008) 
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Table 3.7 Major trading partners   
  Exports partners Imports partners 
ECCU members   
Antigua and Barbuda Spain 34%, Germany 20.7%, Italy 7.7%, Singapore 5.8%, 
UK 4.9% 
US 21.1%, China 16.4%, Germany 13.3%, Singapore 12.7%, Spain 
6.5% 
Dominica UK 24.8%, Jamaica 12.3%, Antigua and Barbuda 9.8%, 
Guyana 8.3%, China 7.9%, Trinidad and Tobago 5.4%, 
Saint Lucia 4.5% 
US 25.3%, China 22.7%, Trinidad and Tobago 13.8%, South Korea 
4.8% 
Grenada Saint Lucia 18.8%, Antigua and Barbuda 12.8%, Saint 
Kitts & Nevis 11.5%, Dominica 11.4%, US 11.4% 
Trinidad and Tobago 33.7%, US 24.2%, UK 4.3% 
Saint Kitts and Nevis US 62%, Canada 9.4%, Netherlands 6.6%, Azerbaijan 5% US 48.9%, Trinidad and Tobago 13.1%, Spain 4.6%, UK 4.5% 
Saint Lucia France 69.7%, US 10.2%, UK 8.8% US 21.1%, Trinidad and Tobago 14.9%, Italy 12.3%, France 11.8%, 
Venezuela 7.2%, UK 6.9%, Netherlands 5.8% 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines France 26.2%, Greece 21.3%, Italy 18.9%, Russia 7.2%, 
UK 6.8% 
Singapore 17.3%, Trinidad and Tobago 12.1%, US 11.1%, Italy 
11%, Spain 9.5%, Turkey 4.6%, Germany 4.4% 
Anguilla UK, US, Puerto Rico, Saint-Martin US, Puerto Rico, UK 
Montserrat US, Antigua and Barbuda US, UK, Trinidad and Tobago, Japan, Canada 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members   
Bahamas Spain 22.3%, US 19.8%, Poland 13.5%, Germany 13%, 
UK 5.7%, Guatemala 4.9% 
US 24.7%, Brazil 15.7%, Japan 13.1%, South Korea 7.8%, Spain 
6.2% 
Barbados US 27.6%, Trinidad and Tobago 15%, UK 10.2%, Saint 
Lucia 7%, Jamaica 6.2%, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 4.3% 
US 37.7%, Trinidad and Tobago 22.6%, UK 5.9% 
Belize US 33.9%, UK 33.6%, Cote d'Ivoire 3.7% US 35.7%, Mexico 13%, Cuba 7.7%, Guatemala 7.2%, China 4.3% 
Guyana US 18.8%, Canada 18.4%, UK 8.7%, Portugal 6.5%, 
Trinidad and Tobago 4.9%, Netherlands 4.3%, Belgium 
4.3%, Jamaica 4.1% 
Trinidad and Tobago 23%, US 21.3%, China 9.7%, Cuba 6.3%, UK 
4.5% 
Haiti US 79.8%, Dominican Republic 7.6%, Canada 3% US 46.5%, Netherlands Antilles 11.9%, Brazil 3.8% 
Jamaica US 30.2%, Canada 15.6%, China 15.2%, UK 10.3%, 
Netherlands 7%, Norway 4.6% 
US 39.3%, Trinidad and Tobago 13.6%, Venezuela 9.5% 
Suriname Norway 23%, Canada 15.5%, US 12.6%, Belgium 10.1%, 
France 8.5%, UAE 6.9%, Iceland 4.6% 
US 29.4%, Netherlands 18.9%, Trinidad and Tobago 14.9%, Japan 
5.1%, China 4.9% 
Trinidad and Tobago US 59.8%, Spain 5.3%, Jamaica 5.2% US 30.6%, Brazil 12%, Venezuela 6.8%, Gabon 7.4%, Colombia 
4.6% 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (July 2008) 
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Table 3.8 Regional trade patterns, 1981-2006 percentage of total exports/imports with the world  
    1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2000-2005 2006 
    Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
ECCU members 
 
Within ECCU 7.8 4.3 8.0 3.9 11.4 3.1 12.6 2.7 13.3 2.4 9.6 2.3 
 
Within CARICOM 29.8 21.6 21.3 14.7 21.8 18.6 29.3 23.3 25.9 24.4 17.6 22.6 
 
With USA 2.8 18.7 14.2 40.7 21.1 34.0 23.5 41.5 25.5 29.0 13.2 23.9 
 
With Japan 0.2 7.6 0.1 5.9 0.2 3.7 0.2 4.6 0.9 3.3 0.4 2.9 
 
With Asia 0.0 2.5 0.0 3.0 0.1 2.5 0.1 2.6 3.8 5.6 3.1 10.7 
 
With European Union 64.2 32.2 61.4 24.6 50.3 29.5 41.1 17.0 33.9 16.4 59.8 27.1 
Non-ECCU CARICOM member 
 
Within CARICOM 1.4 5.6 1.3 4.2 1.8 5.5 2.5 6.8 2.0 6.9 1.6 6.8 
 
With USA 68.2 32.1 61.2 40.4 38.0 42.3 37.5 42.4 49.7 31.1 48.3 28.8 
 
With Japan 0.7 4.3 2.1 4.5 1.6 8.0 1.1 6.2 0.8 4.9 1.5 6.4 
 
With Asia 0.2 7.3 0.4 4.7 1.8 4.8 0.9 7.2 1.8 12.2 2.8 14.1 
 
With European Union 12.7 13.8 15.4 15.1 22.0 20.6 22.9 16.9 17.0 17.2 19.3 12.1 
All CARICOM member 
 
Within CARICOM 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.0 9.5 6.7 14.9 8.0 13.0 8.2 11.5 8.0 
 
With USA 67.3 31.8 59.0 40.5 37.2 41.6 37.0 42.3 49.1 31.0 47.2 28.5 
 
With Japan 0.7 4.4 2.0 4.6 1.5 7.6 1.1 6.0 0.8 4.8 1.5 6.1 
 
With Asia 0.2 7.2 0.4 4.6 1.7 4.6 0.8 6.8 1.9 11.7 2.8 13.8 
  With European Union 13.4 14.2 17.5 15.8 23.3 21.4 23.5 16.9 17.5 17.1 20.6 13.2 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Development Indicators June 2007 
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Table 3.9 Unit Root Tests for CARICOM members 
 
lnY(t) 
 
∆lnY(t) 
 
ADF SP KPSS 
 
ADF SP KPSS 
Antigua and Barbuda 2.47 -1.30 1.00   -1.25 -4.08 0.32 
Dominica 3.20 -1.53 0.96 
 
-1.95 -14.04 0.33 
Grenada 2.17 -1.75 0.99 
 
-1.16 -3.71 0.18 
St.Kitts and Nevis 2.80 -2.00 1.06 
 
-1.61 -3.74 0.14 
St.Lucia 1.81 -1.50 1.00 
 
-1.46 -6.19 0.18 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2.05 -1.43 0.98 
 
-0.84 -4.32 0.37 
Anguilla 2.35 -2.29 0.61 
 
-0.61 -3.28 0.09 
Montserrat -0.13 -2.16 0.39 
 
-2.31 -3.26 0.11 
Bahamas, The -0.73 -2.03 0.21 
 
-1.37 -5.53 0.33 
Barbados 2.28 -1.47 1.00 
 
-3.27 -4.37 0.44 
Belize 1.97 -2.18 1.05 
 
-1.92 -2.85 0.06 
Guyana 0.28 -1.15 0.51 
 
-2.17 -2.92 0.31 
Haiti -0.52 -1.48 0.59 
 
-3.47 -4.65 0.16 
Jamaica 1.54 -1.44 0.98 
 
-2.17 -3.30 0.14 
Suriname 0.65 -2.56 0.35 
 
-2.06 -4.34 0.43 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.56 -1.27 0.46   -1.95 -1.91 0.36 
Asymptotic critical value 
ADF test:  1% -2.56  5% -1.94  10% -1.62 
SP test: 1% -3.56  5% -3.02  10% -2.75 
KPSS test: 1% 0.739  5% 0.463  10% 0.347 
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Table 3.10 Variance Decompositions for ECCU and Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
  
Years 
Y-D 
  U-R U-D 
ECCU members 
Antigua and Barbuda 2 0.59 0.41 
 
10 0.81 0.19 
Dominica 2 0.14 0.86 
 
10 0.27 0.73 
Grenada 2 0.35 0.65 
 
10 0.39 0.61 
St.Kitts and Nevis 2 0.53 0.47 
 
10 0.79 0.21 
St.Lucia 2 0.09 0.91 
 
10 0.23 0.77 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2 0.40 0.60 
 
10 0.56 0.44 
Anguilla 2 0.63 0.37 
 
10 0.65 0.35 
Montserrat 2 0.21 0.79 
 
10 0.30 0.70 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
Bahamas, The 2 0.11 0.89 
 
10 0.12 0.88 
Barbados 2 0.10 0.90 
 
10 0.47 0.53 
Belize 2 0.13 0.87 
 
10 0.42 0.58 
Guyana 2 0.42 0.58 
 
10 0.22 0.78 
Haiti 2 0.31 0.69 
 
10 0.38 0.62 
Jamaica 2 0.20 0.80 
 
10 0.24 0.76 
Suriname 2 0.71 0.29 
 
10 0.85 0.15 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.44 0.56 
  10 0.46 0.54 
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Table 3.11 Variance Decompositions for the CFA franc zone members 
  
Years 
Y-D 
  U-R U-D 
CFA franc zone countries  
  Benin 2 0.10 0.90 
 
10 0.11 0.89 
    Burkina Faso 2 0.03 0.97 
 
10 0.06 0.94 
    Cote d'Ivoire 2 0.44 0.56 
 
10 0.49 0.51 
    Guinea - Bissau 2 0.60 0.40 
 
10 0.61 0.39 
    Mali 2 0.26 0.74 
 
10 0.37 0.63 
    Niger 2 0.00 1.00 
 
10 0.01 0.99 
    Senegal 2 0.05 0.95 
 
10 0.07 0.93 
    Togo 2 0.11 0.89 
 
10 0.16 0.84 
    Cameroon 2 0.14 0.86 
 
10 0.29 0.71 
    Central African Republic 2 0.06 0.94 
 
10 0.06 0.94 
    Chad 2 0.03 0.97 
 
10 0.06 0.94 
    Congo, Republic 2 0.09 0.91 
 
10 0.08 0.92 
    Gabon 2 0.04 0.96 
  10 0.23 0.77 
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Table 3.12 Variance Decompositions for EMU and Non-EMU European countries 
  
Years 
Y-D 
  U-R U-D 
EMU Countries  
  Austria 2 0.70 0.30 
 
10 0.71 0.29 
Finland 2 0.15 0.85 
 
10 0.14 0.86 
Germany 2 0.43 0.57 
 
10 0.44 0.58 
Greece 2 0.77 0.23 
 
10 0.62 0.38 
Ireland 2 0.14 0.86 
 
10 0.13 0.87 
Italy 2 0.21 0.79 
 
10 0.21 0.79 
Netherlands 2 0.38 0.62 
 
10 0.38 0.62 
Portugal 2 0.35 0.65 
 
10 0.46 0.54 
Spain 2 0.70 0.30 
 
10 0.69 0.31 
Non-EMU Countries 
   Denmark 2 0.52 0.48 
 
10 0.57 0.43 
Norway 2 0.29 0.71 
 
10 0.35 0.65 
Sweden 2 0.93 0.07 
 
10 0.80 0.20 
Switzerland 2 0.34 0.66 
 
10 0.42 0.58 
UK 2 0.58 0.42 
  10 0.61 0.39 
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Table 3.13 Robustness Test for ECCU and Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
  
Years 
Y-D 
  U-R U-D 
ECCU members 
Antigua and Barbuda 2 0.79 0.21 
 
10 0.85 0.15 
Dominica 2 0.75 0.25 
 
10 0.82 0.18 
Grenada 2 0.32 0.68 
 
10 0.45 0.55 
St.Kitts and Nevis 2 0.60 0.40 
 
10 0.67 0.33 
St.Lucia 2 0.50 0.50 
 
10 0.60 0.40 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2 0.77 0.23 
 
10 0.82 0.18 
Anguilla 2 0.71 0.29 
 
10 0.72 0.28 
Montserrat 2 0.23 0.77 
 
10 0.24 0.76 
Non-ECCU CARICOM members 
Bahamas, The 2 0.32 0.68 
 
10 0.36 0.64 
Barbados 2 0.26 0.74 
 
10 0.28 0.72 
Belize 2 0.19 0.81 
 
10 0.21 0.79 
Guyana 2 0.09 0.91 
 
10 0.24 0.76 
Haiti 2 0.17 0.83 
 
10 0.29 0.71 
Jamaica 2 0.07 0.93 
 
10 0.26 0.74 
Suriname 2 0.12 0.88 
 
10 0.22 0.78 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.16 0.84 
  10 0.40 0.60 
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Chapter Four 
Liberalization and Economic Integration in East Asia  
Evidence from Stock Prices 
 
4.1 Introduction 
East Asia is a region with great potential for high economic growth given its excellent 
record of economic performance and has long been a focus of attention for economic 
research. However, without a well-established financial infrastructure to support it, the 
economic growth cannot be continuous and progressive.  The 1997 Asian financial crisis 
demonstrated both the vulnerability of the regional financial system and the possibility of 
contagion of crisis once it breaks out. The crisis has rekindled interest in the choice of 
exchange rate regimes and highlighted the necessity of strengthening regional economic 
integration and financial cooperation.  
East Asian nations work in earnest for regional economic integration in the past 
decades. To enhance the East Asian financing facilities in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, the Chiang Mai Initiative was created by 10 member countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3) in May 
2000.23 16 bilateral swap arrangements have been successively concluded by the 10th 
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in May 2007. The ASEAN+3 finance ministers 
also introduced a surveillance system to monitor the region’s economies and to encourage 
good policies via peer pressure. In order to facilitate the channel for better utilization of 
Asian savings for Asian investments and enhance efficiency and liquidity in bonds 
market in Asia, a local currency-denominated bond market under the Asian Bond 
Markets Initiative (ABMI) has been developed. This initiative has produced some visible 
results, including the issuance of Korean Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBO) with a 
guarantee by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Industrial 
Bank of Korea (IBK).24 
                                               
23 ASEAN consists of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. 
24 In addition to the ASEAN, the oldest bloc in Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) was set up in 1989 with 21 member economies. In 2005, the East Asia Summit (EAS) was 
established by ASEAN+3 plus Australia, New Zealand and India, for the total of 16 countries. 
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However there are still a number of issues to be addressed: including facilitating sound 
economic and financial development, increasing cooperation in the region and 
coordinating exchange rate policy. The financial crisis over 1997-1998 has rekindled 
interest in the choice of exchange rate regimes in the emerging market countries, 
including East Asia. One view blames the soft pegs to US dollar for the crises. Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) analyzed the behavior of exchange rate, reserves and interest rate to 
assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving to the corner solution – 
hard pegs or free float. They find that countries that claim that they allow their exchange 
rate to float mostly do not and there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating”. 
The East Asian financial crisis drove the currencies of most countries to float 
immediately afterwards. However, McKinnon and Schnabl (2002) showed that East 
Asian countries resume dollar pegging on high frequency after the crisis. The joint 
exchange rate stabilization of their currency against the dollar reduces payment risk and 
strengthens trade linkages in the region. However, it makes the East Asian economy more 
sensitive to global shocks that may require adjustment in the real exchange rate.  
The success of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the initiatives to 
promote Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as well as far-reaching integration of 
European economies motivated the East Asian economies to pursue further intraregional 
economic integration. Many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) have been initiated to facilitate intraregional trade in the past few 
years.25 The governments in Asia fear that unless they form their own free trade areas, 
they would not be able to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the European Union, the 
United States and other regional groups in multilateral negotiations. 
Having realized the importance of more economic and financial regional integration, 
East Asian countries are looking forward to furthering cooperation in the region and 
seeking the feasibility of building an economic and monetary union26. Key policymakers 
are increasingly vocal about the need to establish a monetary union in the region or create 
a single currency. Inspired by the now defunct European Currency Unit, replaced by the 
                                               
25 According to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) report, there are 157 existing FTA/EPA 
initiatives within APEC member countries by 2007 and 207 additional FTA/EPAs are under negotiation 
and 6 more are under discussion among APEC countries. See Table 2 for details.  
26 According to Balassa (1960), the degree of economic integration can be categorized into six stages: 1. 
Preferential trading area; 2. Free trade area; 3. Customs union; 4. Common market; 5. Economic and 
monetary union; 6. Complete economic integration. 
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Euro, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) proposes the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) – a 
weighted index of currencies for ASEAN+3 – to promote regional monetary and financial 
integration. Despite numerous technical and political obstacles, the ACU has been 
moving forward from an “academic exercise” to “a real outcome, one that can be used in 
the market” amid a growing consensus among academic and policy practitioners that 
intraregional exchange rate stability is desirable for East Asia and a monetary union is the 
ultimate form to ensure it. 27   
The purpose of this paper is to seek the answer to a related question: Is East Asia ready 
for a regional single currency and does it satisfy optimum currency area (OCA) criteria?   
Friedman (1953) proposed that, without price and wage flexibility, flexible exchange 
rates usually ensure better macroeconomic outcomes than fixed exchange rates. However, 
Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) argued that a fixed exchange rate can produce 
better outcomes for a group of economies that are closely integrated and subject to 
similar economic shocks. A high degree of the economic integration in the form of a 
currency union (or a fixed exchange rate), on the one hand, increases the monetary 
efficiency by reducing the transaction cost and avoiding uncertainty and confusion in 
calculation that can arise under floating exchange rate. On the other hand, joining in a 
currency union or maintaining a fixed exchange rate entails a cost in the form of the loss 
of monetary policy autonomy. The theory of optimum currency area identifies the 
conditions under which a group of economies are better off adopting permanently fixed 
exchange rates or forming a currency area. According to Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969), the OCA criteria can be summarized into the following groups: 
(i) the symmetry of shocks across economies, (ii) trading patterns – high intraregional 
trade, (iii) openness of economy – high capital and labor mobility between different 
economies, (iv) intensive financial market integration, and (v) coordination of monetary 
policies.  
In this paper, we employ a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) method to 
investigate the extent of financial market integration in East Asia. Returns to investors in 
each country’s market are affected by three types of underlying shocks: country-specific 
                                               
27 From the discussion in 39th Annual Meeting of Asian Development Bank. The Asian Development Bank 
was to announce the details of the ACU in March 2006. However external pressures delayed this 
announcement although the concept was still being studied in detail. 
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shocks, regional shocks and global shocks. These structural shocks are identified by a 
long-run restriction a la Blanchard and Quah (1979). To investigate the progress in 
financial integration, we also separate the sample into 8 non-overlapping 2-year 
subperiods before and after the crisis. We then compare the East Asian region with that of 
15 European countries where the latter serves as a benchmark.   
A comparison with the European benchmark estimates suggests that the model 
produces reasonable results. The empirical results show that, in all East Asian stock 
markets, country-specific shocks are dominant although they became less important in 
the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period.28 Regional shocks play a minimal role 
in most cases while the importance of global shocks varies across countries depending on 
the extent of financial openness and development.  In European countries, in marked 
contrast, external shocks that combine both global and regional shocks appear to take 
over the dominant position. This suggests that, despite years of efforts toward financial 
liberalization and cooperation in the region, the East Asian economies are subject to 
asymmetric shocks and far less integrated financially compared to the European 
countries. Theory of optimum currency area would predict that pegging to the same 
currency would be more costly in East Asia than it would be in European countries. The 
region seems sufficiently unique perhaps due to different resource endowments, growth 
experience or economic policies. The efforts for financial integration in the post-crisis 
period appear to have some effects on the economic and financial structure in the region. 
However, as the European experiences may suggest, economic integration is a long-run 
process that could take decades.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the current extent of 
trade and financial integration in East Asia. Section 4.3 illustrates the data and 
methodology used in our empirical analyses. Section 4.4 examines the degrees and 
patterns of regional shocks and country-specific shocks on domestic stock market by 
using forecast error variance decomposition. Section 4.5 investigates the robustness of 
the benchmark model. Section 4.6 provides concluding remarks. 
  
                                               
28 There are noticeable drops in the role of country-specific shocks in Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Australia. The decline is not uniform though. There are wide variations between 
periods.  There are substantial increases in the role of global shocks in Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia while little changes in China. 
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4.2 Economic Integration in East Asia  
4.2.1 Trade Integration in East Asia  
A high degree of intraregional trade can increase the efficiency gain by using a 
common currency and lower the cost of losing monetary policy autonomy.29 There is 
some evidence that joining a currency union can increase trade among member countries, 
which will further strengthen the case for the formation of the currency union.30  The 
extent of regional integration through trade in Asia has been rising fast over the last 
twenty years. Countries with close trade links are more likely to benefit from fixed 
exchange rates and monetary integration. Wyplosz (2001) used a gravity approach to 
determine a “normal level” of bilateral trade among Asian and European economies and 
found that Asia is more, while Europe is less, integrated than one would expect. Table 1 
summarizes the changes in the share of intraregional trade for various regions in the 
world over the period of 1980-2006. The table demonstrates that the intraregional trade 
ratios among East Asian are still lower than those of European Monetary Union by more 
than 10 percent in 2006.31 However, the intraregional export and import have risen 
dramatically from the 1980s through the 2000s. For instance, in 1980, 37 percent of total 
import and export were with the regional trading partners. By 2006, the figures rose to 
48.6 percent and 51.9 percent, respectively.  
The first part in Table 4.1 reports trade patterns in the ASEAN. Intraregional trade 
within the ASEAN increased steadily since 1980 except a slight downturn in 
intraregional exports after 1995, perhaps reflecting the recessionary consequences of the 
financial crisis that hit the region. The roles of the United States and Japan are still 
dominant but have declined over the whole period. In addition, there is a significant 
increase in intraregional trade ratio in a broader region. By adding China, Hong Kong, 
Japan and Korea to the region, we find that nearly half of international trade of the region 
is with regional partners in 2006. The United States is still the largest importer in East 
Asian trade, but it is no longer the largest exporter. Trade with the Euro area increased 
                                               
29 Lee and Barro (2007) find that a currency union can generate welfare gains from the additional trade with 
countries belonging to the same currency union, which in turn stimulates an increase in consumption 
growth rates.  
30 Rose (2000) reports that bilateral trade between countries that use the same currency is over 200 percent 
larger than otherwise, controlling for other effects.  
31 In the paper, the intra-regional trade ratio is defined as exports or imports within the region as a share of 
total exports or imports with the world. 
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early, peaked in 1990 at 17.9 percent for exports and 15.1 percent for imports. Since then, 
the trade preference of East Asia with Euro area has declined. Exports to the Euro area 
dropped to 15.4 percent and imports from Euro area dropped to 10.1 percent in 2006.  
In the third panel, Australia and New Zealand are added to East Asia. Not surprisingly, 
the extent of intraregional trade increases even further and reaches 50 percent. With those 
two Pacific countries, intraregional trade becomes larger within the region and there is 
significant increase in trade between East Asian and United States and Euro area.  
The fourth panel lists the trade pattern for the Euro area within the region and with the 
outside world. We find the intraregional trade in the Euro area is stable and maintained at 
around 65 percent.  Regional trade integration in the Euro area is about 10 percent higher 
than that in East Asia in recent years.  
 
4.2.2 Financial integration in East Asia and the Chiang Mai Initiative  
Before the Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997, few would have seriously argued 
for the creation of a new regional financial cooperation system.  Economic integration in 
the region had been mostly a market-led process. One of the most noteworthy outcomes 
of the financial crisis would be the initiation of regional financial cooperation by the East 
Asian economies. The financial crisis gave East Asia a strong impetus to search for a 
regional mechanism that could forestall future crisis. Japanese financial authorities 
proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as a framework for promoting 
financial cooperation and policy coordination in the region at the G7-IMF meetings in 
Hong Kong during September 20-25, 1997.32 The United States, EU and the IMF 
opposed the proposition on grounds of moral hazard and duplication. In November 1997 
the East Asian economies, together with the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, agreed to establish the so-called “Manila Framework Group (MFG)” in order to 
develop a concerted approach to restoring financial stability in the East Asia. The Manila 
                                               
32 The intrepid proposal for a regional alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seemed to arise 
without warning and at the worst possible moment. Both the Philippines and Indonesia had floated their 
currencies and the Asian Financial Crisis was increasingly showing signs of contagion at the time. The 
proposal raised temporary hopes among the crisis-ridden economies of Asia but elicited a stringent rebuke 
from the IMF and the US Treasury and ultimately fell to the wayside in favor of a more IMF-centered 
approach. See Phillip (2003). 
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Framework took an initiative to create a mechanism for regional surveillance 
complimentary to the global surveillance by the IMF.33  
In October 1998, Japan pledged $30 billion to support the economic recovery of the 
crisis-affected countries. The initiative provided major assistance for restructuring 
corporate debt, reforming financial sectors, strengthening social safety nets, generating 
employment and addressing the credit crunch. The initiative was called “New Miyazawa 
Initiative” and was highly successful.34 In November 1998, the United States and Japan 
jointly announced the Asia Growth and Recovery Initiative (AGRI), which was a 
multilateral effort to stimulate economic growth in Asia. With support from the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), AGRI supported corporate restructuring 
and restored market to private capital. It also strengthened bond guarantee functions of 
the World Bank and the ADB.  
The idea of an AMF was revived when the finance ministers of China, Japan and 
South Korea, along with the ten ASEAN members, agreed on May 6th, 2000 in Chiang 
Mai, Thailand to establish a system of swap arrangements within the group. The regional 
scheme for financial cooperation known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is now 
gathering momentum and opening the doors to possibly significant policy-led integration 
in East Asia. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) has two components: expanded ASEAN 
Swap Arrangements (ASA) encompassing the ten ASEAN countries; and a network of 
Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSA) repurchasing arrangements basically encompassing 
the thirteen ASEAN + 3 countries.   
                                               
33 Manila Framework terminated its function in November 2004 after 12 meetings. The failure of the 
Manila Framework is said to be attributable to the lack of mutual trust and lack of a professional secretariat. 
34 The Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Finance of Malaysia have reached an agreement 
regarding the basic features of the short-term financing facility under the framework of the "New 
Miyazawa Initiative". The facility is aimed at supporting credit-extending schemes which intend to promote 
economic activities in Malaysia, such as a trade financing facility, small and medium size enterprise credit 
line, etc. This will serve as a standby facility for the Malaysian Government should the need arise. In this 
short-term facility, the Japanese Ministry of Finance is committed to providing up to US$ 2.5 billion 
liquidity to Bank Negara Malaysia, if and when necessary, through swap transactions between the US 
dollar and the Ringgit.  
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At present, the total amount of BSAs covering all 13 countries is estimated to be 
around $83 billion.35 The maximum amount that any individual country can draw varies a 
great deal. For instance, the maximum liquidity through the CMI to Thailand is about $12 
billion while the BSA to Malaysia is $6.5 billion. Doubts have been raised as to whether 
the BSA system could truly be a credible and effective system of defense against future 
speculative attacks. The success of the CMI will depend on whether the surveillance 
system in East Asia can work as effectively as expected. A mechanism that enforces 
exchange of information and applies peer review and pressure through policy 
coordination is the right approach to boost the confidence of the countries in the region. It 
is expected that East Asia will reach deeper monetary and economic integration with 
gradual development of the CMI to a more effective and efficient regional arrangement.  
 
4.2.3 Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) 
Because of the underdevelopment of capital markets, Asian countries have depended 
on short-term foreign currency-denominated financing. This causes “maturity” and 
“currency” mismatches which make the region vulnerable to volatility in short-term 
capital movements. For example, a bank that chose to borrow entirely in U.S. dollars and 
lend in Thai bahts would have a significant currency mismatch: if the value of the baht 
were to fall dramatically, the bank would lose a great deal of money. Similarly, a bank 
would have a maturity mismatch if it has substantial long term assets such as fixed rate 
mortgages but short-term liabilities such as deposits. The Asian financial crisis vividly 
illustrates the risks of the double mismatches. Developing bond markets in the region is 
very effective in regional financing. A well-functioning bond market sets the benchmark 
interest rates for all debts with varying maturities and risks which promote efficient uses 
of resources for economic growth.  At the 6th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in 
August 2003 at Manila, the Philippines, finance ministers agreed to promote Asian bond 
markets. The Asian Bond Market Initiative aims to develop efficient and liquid bond 
markets in Asia, enabling better utilization of Asian savings for Asian investment. 
                                               
35 Japan concluded six agreements with China, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Malaysia: two-way arrangement with China, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines and one-way 
arrangement with Indonesia and Malaysia. Korea concluded four agreements in addition to Japan-Korean 
BSA. China concluded four agreements in addition to its agreements with Japan and Korea except with 
Singapore. See Table 1 for details. Figure is from Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
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Activities of the ABMI focus on the following two areas: (1) facilitating access to the 
market through a wider variety of issuer and types of bonds, and (2) enhancing market 
infrastructure to foster bond markets in Asia. A robust primary and secondary bond 
market in Asia requires a wide variety of issuers and products that could be addressed by 
encouraging: (1) Sovereign bond issuance by Asian governments to establish 
benchmarks; (2) Asian government financial institutions to issue bonds in Asia to meet 
their financing requirements; (3) The creation of asset-backed securities markets, 
including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs); (4) Bond issuance in the region by 
multilateral development banks and government agencies; (5) Bond issuance in the 
region for funding foreign direct investment in Asian countries; and (6) The expansion of 
local currency-denominations of bonds and the introduction of currency-basket bonds. 
At the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting (AFMM+3) on August 7, 2003, six 
voluntary working group (WG) on the ABMI have been established to address key areas 
of bond market development. Since the establishment of the six WGs, comprehensive 
efforts have been made to develop regional bond markets. 36 On May 15, 2004 in Jeju, 
Korea, AFMM+3 confirmed the establishment of a Focal Group (FG) to coordinate the 
work of ABMI working groups. The first FG meeting was held on March 19, 2004 in 
Manila and since then FG meetings have been held biannually. On May 4, 2005 in 
Istanbul, Turkey AFMM+3 endorsed the reorganization of the ABMI WGs and made 
changes accordingly. 37  Asian governments, central banks and the Asian Development 
Bank are keen to see the expansion of Asian bond markets in order to help provide 
finance for the large infrastructural development that the region needs over the next 
decade. Alongside the expansion of the bond markets, Asian governments and central 
banks are currently discussing the creation of an Asian Currency Unit. The ADB has 
suggested that bonds may also be issued in ACU over the next few years which would 
help lower the financing costs for Asian issuers who have substantial trade links with 
other countries in the region.  
 
 
 
                                               
36 See table 4 ABMI Working Groups for details 
37 See table 4 Changes for details 
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4.2.4 Stock Markets in East Asia 
Stock exchanges in Asia developed much later than those in Europe or America. The 
first Asian market for securities trading was in Shanghai which began in the late 1860s. 
The first share list appeared in June 1866. The Bombay Stock Exchange, launched in 
1875, was the oldest organized market in the region, followed by the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) three years later. In 1891 during the boom in mining shares, foreign 
businessmen founded the "Shanghai Sharebrokers' Association" headquartered in 
Shanghai as China's first stock exchange.  
Off to a late start amid dramatic historic events, Asian stock markets were quick to 
adopt cutting-edge strategies and have experienced rapid growth. They espoused 
technology, demutualized and listed their own shares long before U.S. markets did. The 
Tokyo Stock Exchange is the second stock exchange in the world by market value, 
second only to the New York Stock Exchange. It currently lists 2,271 domestic 
companies and 31 foreign companies, with a total market capitalization of over 5 trillion 
dollars38. The Tokyo Stock Exchange was established on May 15th, 1878 and in 1943, the 
exchange was combined with ten other stock exchanges in major Japanese cities to form 
a single exchange. Stocks listed on the TSE are separated into the first section (large 
companies), the second section (mid-sized companies) and the “mother” section (high-
growth startup companies). The Tokyo Stock Exchange is also developing jointly traded 
products and sharing technology with London Stock Exchange, marking the latest cross-
border deal among bourses as international competition heats up. It has also been looking 
for some partners in Asia as evidenced by the fact that, in June 2007, the TSE paid $303 
million to acquire a 4.99% stake in the Singapore Exchange as the beginning of a bigger 
participation.  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange was reestablished on November 26, 1990. A market 
capitalization of nearly $2.38 trillion makes it the fifth largest in the world.  There are 
two types of stocks being issued in the Shanghai Stock Exchange: A shares and B shares. 
A shares are priced in the local Renminbi yuan currency, while B shares are quoted in 
U.S. dollars. Initially, trading in A shares is restricted to domestic investors only while B 
shares are available to both domestic (since 2001) and foreign investors. However, after 
                                               
38 Information from Wikipedia.org 
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reforms were implemented in December 2002, foreign investors are now allowed to trade 
in A shares with some restrictions under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(QFII) system and there is a plan to eventually merge the two types of shares. 
The stock price indices for East Asian stock markets and European stock markets are 
plotted in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. Despite divulging economic and financial conditions 
in various countries, the stock prices seem to share similar movements. There is a steep 
decline after the 1997 financial crisis for most East Asian countries; the East Asian stock 
prices and European stock prices exhibit a common decline after 2002 in most countries 
presumably due to sharp increases in oil prices. As the economies recovered in 2003, the 
indices resumed the rising trend in these European countries.  
In this paper we employ and focus on overall stock price indices as indicator of the 
overall performance of the economy.  It is well known that stock prices are a good 
leading indicator of economic activity. In the past few decades, significant development 
of the stock market and real economic activity has been witnessed around the world. 
Traditional stock market valuation models suggest that there should be a close link 
between stock prices and real economic activity. The main argument comes from the 
belief that the price of a firm’s stock equals the expected present value of the firm’s 
future payouts or dividends. As long as these expectations reflect the underlying 
fundamental factors, they must ultimately also reflect the real economic activity as 
measured by industrial production or GDP. Under these assumptions, the stock market is 
a passive informant of future real activity as stock prices react immediately to new 
information about the future real activity well before it occurs.39  Capital market 
integration provides an opportunity for better diversification as investors shift to higher 
                                               
39 Fama (1990) showed that stock returns are actually significant in explaining future real activity for the 
whole period from 1953 to 1987 in the United States stock market. Quarterly and annual stock returns are 
highly correlated with future production growth rates. According to the reported regressions past stock 
returns are significant in explaining current production growth rates and vice versa.  Merton (1984) found 
that movements in the United States stock prices were positively correlated with real GNP. Schwert (1990) 
showed that Fama’s results could be replicated by using data that goes back as far as to 1889. He finds the 
correlation between future production growth rates and current stock returns to be robust for the whole 
period from 1889 to 1988.  However, Binswanger (2000) concluded that traditional links between stock 
market performance and two major macroeconomic indicators, production and GDP, broke down in the 
most recent United States bull market. Although the regressions of stock returns on measures of real 
activity in the United States over the period from 1953 to 1997 seem to confirm the findings of Fama 
(1990), stocks returns do not reflect real activity in the current stock market boom from 1984 to 1997.   In 
recent research, Mao (2007) found the links between stock prices and industrial production or GDP 
remained strong during the high-growth phase since 1980s in the Australian stock market. 
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risk and expected return projects because they are able to diversify their overall risk. 
(Obtsfeld, 1994) The availability of high-frequency data is also a big advantage in our 
case where the sample period is short due to general data problems of developing 
countries and made even shorter as a result of the recent financial crisis and resulting 
structural breaks.  
4.3 Data and Methodology 
According to the theory of optimum currency area, joining a single currency area 
brings in costs and benefits. The benefits are from avoiding the uncertainty and confusion 
in calculation and transactions costs that can arise under floating exchange rates. At the 
same time, adopting a single currency can induce significant costs. The costs arise from 
the inability to use monetary and exchange rate policy for economic stabilization. If the 
business cycles in the member countries are closely correlated and their economic 
structures are similar, then costs are likely to be lower than otherwise. On the assumption 
that aggregate demand shocks are regime specific while aggregate supply shocks are 
likely not to vary with respect to changes in the exchange rate regime, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) examined the correlation of aggregate supply shocks across potential 
member countries which are extracted applying a structural vector autoregressive model 
to real income and the price level data.  
We separate shocks for product or factor markets into “global” shocks, “regional” 
shocks and “country specific” or “domestic” shocks. The importance of regional shocks 
is taken as the indicator of similarity of economic structure within the potential member 
countries. We employ the overall stock price index as an indicator of macroeconomic 
performance to identify the three underlying shocks. Table 5 lists the detailed information 
on the major stock price indices chosen for 12 major stock exchanges in East Asia: Japan, 
P.R. China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, 
the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Data are from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 
2006. Data from July 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998 are omitted because of large turmoil 
due to the financial crises in the region during that period. The model using the 16 
European stock price indices is used as the benchmark. Table 6 reports the information 
for those European stock markets. The 16 European countries in the paper consist of 11 
EMU countries − Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
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Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain − and 5 non-EMU countries − Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Stock price data are ideal for our purpose 
since the availability of high frequency data as a proxy for macroeconomic performance 
can overcome the serious problem of having to work with a short-time span such as the 
post-crisis period, for which at best 6-7 years of data are available.40 All data are 
weekly41.  
In this model, stock market indices are affected by three different types of shocks. They 
arise from the global market, the regional markets and the domestic market and are 
denoted as g
t
u , r
t
u and d
t
u , respectively. Global, regional and domestic price indices − 
g
t
y , r
t
y , and d
t
y  − are related to the three structural shocks as follows: 
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A L a a L a L a L= + + + +  are polynomials of the lag operator .L  For the 
identification of structural shocks, we employ the restrictions of the Blanchard-Quah 
(1989) type. In other words, 1) neither regional nor country-specific shocks have long-run 
effects on the global index; 2) country-specific shocks have no long-run effects on the 
regional index. The identifying assumptions imply that the cumulative effects of a 
d
t
u shock on r
t
y  is equal to zero and so are the cumulative effect of the d
t
u or r
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u shocks 
on g
t
y . More specifically, 23 12 13
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= = =∑ ∑ ∑ . Finally, each structural shock has 
unit variance and is uncorrelated to other shocks.  
                                               
40 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that stock price indices are a significant predictor of currency crisis. 
As the crisis nears, changes in stock prices are about 40 percent below those observed in non-crisis periods. 
Weakening equity prices reflects both deteriorating cyclical position of the economy and reduced foreign 
demand as capital inflows are reversed and worsening balance sheets of firms. The beginning of a recession 
is also reflected in the stock market, which collapses a year before the crisis.  
41 Stock price index data in this study are retrieved from Data stream (Thompson Financial) and Yahoo 
Finance; the data for exchange rate are collected from PERS (Pacific Exchange Rate Service) from 
University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business. GDP, PPP data are from WDI (World 
Development Indicator) online database.   
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We transform the stock price indices which are originally reported in local currency 
terms into US dollar terms by dividing by the exchange rate – defined as the local 
currency price of a unit of US dollar. So the stock price index is: 
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The regional and global indices are defined as follows. For the benchmark European 
model, we use the U.S. stock market price index as the global index. The regional index 
is represented by the weighted average of stock price indices of the selected European 
countries excluding the target country’s index. For the East Asian model, the regional 
index is the weighted average of indices of all East Asian stock markets excluding the 
target country’s market index. The global index is the weighted average of stock prices 
from the U.S., Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom stock markets. The 
weights for the global and regional indices are based on constant PPP-value GDP 
estimates, averaged over the 1994 to 2006 period. Table 4.7 lists the weighting system 
employed for each country.  
 
4.4 Empirical Results  
The results of unit root tests are reported in Table 4.8. We employ the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Schmidt-Phillips (SP) test, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. The null hypothesis for the ADF and the SP tests is that the 
stock price index is non-stationary. A time trend is included in all regressions; the 
number of lags used in the unit root tests is determined using the optimal lag length 
tests.42 The null hypothesis that the stock market index is non-stationary cannot be 
                                               
42 Usually, we can use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC), and  
Schwarz Criterion (SC) to determine the optimal lag length of autoregressive models. They are defined as:  
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rejected for any East Asian countries with the ADF and SP tests. For the KPSS test, the 
null hypothesis is that the stock indices are stationary. The results indicate that the null is 
rejected at the conventional significance level. When the same tests are applied to the 
first differences of the series, the unit-root null is strongly rejected with the ADF and SP 
tests and the stationarity null is not rejected with the KPSS test. These results imply that 
each stock-index series contains a unit root and thus should be first differenced to achieve 
stationarity43.  
We estimate a structural vector autoregressive model for two groups of countries: East 
Asia and Europe. The results of the forecast error variance decomposition for East Asian 
countries at 10-week forecast horizon are reported in Table 4.9. Global shocks, regional 
shocks and country-specific shocks are denoted as ‘U-G’, ‘U-R’ and ‘U-D’ respectively. 
For brevity, we report only the variance decompositions of the domestic price index since 
the regional and global indices are mostly explained by regional and global shocks 
themselves.  
Table 4.9 reports the forecast error variance decomposition for the European countries. 
Global shocks on average explain 25 percent of the variations in the domestic stock price 
index throughout all sample periods. About 26 percent of variations are due to regional 
shocks. Country-specific shocks explain averagely 49 percent of fluctuations in its price 
index.  Table 9 also shows that the role of country-specific shocks declines over time in 
all countries. Thus, after period V, less than 35 percent of variations in the stock price can 
be explained by its own market shocks in all European countries comparing more than 50 
percent before period V. It is also interesting that country-specific shocks have a smaller 
role in large economies in Europe. For instance, in period VI, they explain less than 10 
percent of its price index variations in France and Germany.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
where )(~ 2 nuσ  is estimated by 
T
uu ˆˆ′
, n is the number of lagged differences and T is the number of 
observations. The computation of 
t
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43 See Table 4.8 for details. 
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For most European countries, regional and global shocks play an increasingly 
important role over time. Global shocks explained less than 15 percent of most countries’ 
domestic stock market price variations before the introduction of the euro in 1999. More 
than 35 percent of domestic price variations are explained by global shocks after period 
VI. In big economies such as Germany, France, and the U.K., global shocks are 
responsible for more than 60 percent of variations of the domestic price index in the 
period VI. Although there are some declines in recent years, global shocks explain more 
than 30 percent of domestic stock price variations in most European countries.  
Another reason that we observe slight decreases in the role of global market shocks 
and diminishing roles in country-specific shocks is a rise in the role of regional shocks. 
Regional shocks play an increasingly more important role in recent years. In almost every 
European country except Finland, the regional shocks can explain more than 40 percent 
of domestic market price variations in period VIII (2005 - 2006).  
These results are reasonable given the fact that financial market openings pursued in 
European countries beginning in the 1980s have caused the stock market in each country 
to be more exposed to external/global shocks. It is also interesting to note that the 
introduction of the euro has accelerated the globalization of each stock market whether 
the country has become a member of the EMU or not. At same time, the fixed exchange 
rate arrangement under the European Monetary System (EMS) and the efforts of 
individual countries to participate in the single currency area seem to have gradually 
increased the extent of financial integration among the EMU and non-EMU members 
alike as indicated by the increasing role of regional shocks in virtually all European 
countries in the recent periods.  
Table 4.10 reports the variance decompositions of stock price indices in East Asian 
economies. One cannot fail to notice sharp contrasts between Tables 4.9 and 4.10. First of 
all, in most East Asian economies, country-specific shocks are dominant in the 
determination of domestic price index for all estimation periods. Country specific shocks 
are responsible for 90 percent or more of changes in the local stock price index for all 
periods in all countries except Thailand. With the financial crisis, the role of country-
specific shocks seems to have declined in several countries including Japan, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia. Nevertheless, they are still far more important 
than that can be observed in the European countries, explaining 70 percent or more 
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except Hong Kong and Australia.44  China is also exceptional in that country-specific 
shocks continue to be dominant or appear to have become more important after the 
financial crisis. Before and after the crisis, more than 90 percent variations in China’s 
stock prices are explained by its own domestic shocks.45 
Regarding the role of external shocks, we find that there is a substantial increase in the 
role of global shocks in the post-crisis period in Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Australia, and in subperiod VIII in Malaysia and Indonesia. For instance, 32 percent of 
variations in the domestic stock price are explained by global shocks in Singapore in the 
most recent period, up from about 6 percent in period IV. On the other hand, little change 
is observed in Thailand and the Philippines after the financial crisis. The two countries 
may have been highly open financially even before the crisis.  
Another important difference between the European and the East Asian financial 
markets is the role of regional shocks. Compared to country-specific and global shocks, 
regional shocks seem to be negligible in the East Asia economies, explaining 5 percent or 
less of changes in the local stock price index in all cases except Singapore. In the post-
crisis period, particularly in period VII, there were noticeable increases in their role in 
several countries including Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
However, the increases did not last and evaporated in period VIII. The lack of sustained 
increase in the importance of regional shocks in East Asian economies is surprising given 
the scope of liberalization of trade and financial markets, which is expected to make the 
countries more open and susceptible to increased capital flows and other external shocks.  
 
4.5 Robustness 
Japan has been the dominant economic power in East Asia. However, China, upon its 
rapid growth of the past several decades, has rapidly become a regional and global player. 
                                               
44 There are also sharp declines in the role of country-specific shocks in a few years after the crisis. For 
instance, from period V to period VI, fluctuations in the domestic stock price due to own shocks declined 
from 86 percent to 46 percent, 76 to 52 percent, and 84 to 47 percent in the three countries. The decline is 
probably due to the fact that stock markets in these economies were able to avoid the sharp falls followed 
by sharp recoveries instead of any other structural factors. 
 
45 The China stock exchange used to separate the market into A share and B share markets. Foreign 
investors, who were allowed to participate only in B shares, can invest in the A share market after 
December 2002. The results seem to suggest that numerous remaining restrictions might still limit the size 
and effect of external influences on the local stock market of China. 
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The emergence of China and the decade-long stagnation of Japan have complicated the 
leadership position in the region.46 Any currency arrangement in the region is likely to 
involve the Japanese yen and the Chinese yuan as major components. We thus consider 
each of the two countries as an alternate global index and reestimate the extent of 
regional integration. 
 We build our alternative models by identifying various structural shocks with a more 
narrowly defined “global shocks”. For the first alternative model, reported in Table 11, 
we define the global price index using the Japanese Stock price index only and the 
regional proxy as the output-weighted price indices of East countries excluding Japan. In 
the second alternative model, reported in Table 12, the Chinese stock price index is 
chosen as a proxy for the global index and all the rest of East Asian countries output-
weighted stock price indices are used as the regional index.  
Tables 4.11 and Table 4.12 report the forecast error variance decompositions for East 
Asian countries using alternative definitions of the regional and global indices.  As can be 
seen, results are qualitatively similar to the benchmark. Country-specific shocks are still 
dominant in the determination of the domestic price index for all estimation periods. 
Their role declines in the post-crisis periods; however, the roles of global and regional 
shocks increase. In the case of Singapore, country-specific shocks became less influential 
than did global shocks by the 2005-2006 period. Only 38 percent of domestic stock price 
fluctuations can be explained by its own market shocks while 48 percent are due to global 
(Japanese) stock markets. On average, shocks from the Japanese market explain 11 
percent of changes in East Asian stock price indices through all periods. Compared to the 
pre-crisis periods, regional shocks and global shocks play more important roles in the 
post-crisis periods.  
Table 4.12 reports the results, with the Chinese stock price index as the global proxy.  
Country-specific shocks explain more than 80 percent domestic stock prices fluctuations 
throughout the sample period. However, in the post-crisis period, especially the most 
recent period, there is a significant increase in the role of global shocks and regional 
                                               
46 Several factors block the natural emergence of a leader country in East Asia similar to the United States 
in the Western Hemisphere or the Franco-German alliance in Western Europe.  
Japan has been mired in economic stagnation over the last decade and China, while recently emerging as an 
economic power, has a long way to go to achieve fundamental transition to a market -based democratic 
economy. 
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shocks. In period VIII, the two types of shocks contribute nearly 30% of stock price 
variations. Reflecting rapid growth of China in the last few decades, its influence on other 
stock markets in the region is growing as well. Thus, in the most recent period, the 
Chinese market became more influential than regional markets such as Hong Kong and 
Malaysia, or nearly as influential as Australia and New Zealand markets.  
In general, East Asia has become more similar after the financial crisis in the sense 
that global and regional shocks play more important roles. However, regional shocks still 
play far less important role than that can be observed in the European countries.  This 
diversity and heterogeneity within East Asia could constitute a serious impediment to 
regional policy coordination and hinder economic and monetary integration in the near 
future.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate trade liberalization and financial integration in East Asia 
with the focus on the movements of stock prices. We apply the OCA theoretic criterion to 
examine whether pegging to a common currency is a desirable option in Asia. In our 
model, the stock price index is subject to three types of shocks: global, regional and 
country-specific shocks. We apply a structural VAR analysis to 8 non-overlapping sub-
periods in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Comparison with the European 
benchmark estimates suggests that the model produces reasonable results. The empirical 
results suggest that country-domestic shocks are still dominant in all East Asian stock 
markets whereas external shocks that combine both global and regional shocks appear to 
take over the dominant position in European countries. This suggests that, despite years 
of efforts toward liberalization and financial integration in the region, countries in East 
Asia are subject to asymmetric shocks. Theory of optimum currency area would predict 
that pegging to the same currency would be more costly in East Asia than would be the 
case in European countries. The region seems sufficiently unique perhaps due to different 
resource endowments, growth experiences or economic policies. The efforts for financial 
integration in the post-crisis period appear to have some effects on the economic and 
financial structures in the region. However, it is too soon to see lasting changes. 
Our results also contradict the previous study by Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) 
who find that East Asian countries are almost as qualified as the EMU countries in terms 
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of OCA criteria. We find that regional shocks tend to play increasingly more important 
role in Asia as financial markets become more integrated with those of the United States 
and Japan. Nonetheless, our results indicate that there may be a general lack of similarity 
in shocks in the region. A more flexible exchange rate regime might be more desirable 
and a full-fledged monetary integration seems too early an option to consider in East 
Asia. The regional economies should strengthen information and resource coordination. 
Some sub-regional currency stabilization schemes that involve a smaller set of countries 
could be considered.  
Frankel and Rose (1998) argued that the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria can be 
endogenous. According to this view, once a group of economies adopt a single currency 
or permanently fix their exchange rates, the degree of intraregional economic integration 
will become higher and the degree of symmetry of economic shocks will heighten. 
Essentially, a permanently fixed exchange rate promotes OCA conditions by encouraging 
trade of goods and services, capital flows and labor mobility and linking the economies 
more tightly. The view is based on the empirical findings that the act of one economy 
fixing its exchange rate against the currency of another does stimulate international trade 
and investment between the two. The impact is more pronounced if the economies adopt 
a common currency, the strongest form of permanently fixing the exchange rate. 
It has been recognized that East Asia can sustain high economic growth rates if its 
economy is integrated as a region. An integrated economy would give East Asia more 
weight in international trade negotiations, largely in the World Trade Organization and in 
global financial discussions, as in the International Monetary Fund. The experience of the 
European Union (EU) has provided a lesson on this. From the start of the long process of 
the integration in 1958, the member states of the EU achieved rapid economic growth and 
gained considerable economic strength. Meanwhile, the process and achievement of 
integration have enabled Europe to transcend and relegate the past conflicts that had 
devastated the continent so many times in history.  
The devastating effects of the 1997 financial crisis have spurred nations in East Asia to 
consider doing something similar to what Europe has accomplished. There are talks about 
a single regional currency in East Asia or Southeast Asia area. Although the idea of 
forming one community like the European Union seems too ambitious at first because of 
cultural and historical dissimilarities among East Asian countries, the obstacles and 
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differences do not seem insurmountable now. European integration was driven by the 
chastening experience of war and the necessity of Franco-German reconciliation. It was 
built upon Europe’s traditions, the strong interdependence of the European economies 
and a common culture rooted in Christianity. However, it took almost half a century for 
the euro to go from an idea and ambition to reality and use. It took more than four 
decades for the EU to evolve from what was originally a much more limited coal and 
steel trading arrangement. For East Asia, one important lesson from the European 
experience is that the process of achievement of closer integration is a step-by-step 
approach. Mutual trust among member nations is essential for lasting stability of the 
integration. Although Europe and East Asia are different in many aspects culturally and 
economically, it does not mean that East Asia cannot be driven by similar economic 
imperatives of regional economic integration as Europe was. The European experience 
might be replicated to some significant extent in East Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Regional Trade Patterns, 1980 to 2007 (Percentage of Total Exports/Imports with the World) 
    1980 1990 1995 2000 2006 
    Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
ASEAN 
          
 
Within ASEAN 21.2 16.8 25.3 19.7 31.7 23.5 29.8 27.8 29.2 29.3 
 
With USA 16.3 15.3 19.4 14.4 18.4 13.8 19.0 14.0 14.0 9.7 
 
With Japan 29.5 22.1 18.9 23.1 14.3 23.7 13.4 19.1 10.4 12.1 
 
With Euro Area 13.1 14.4 16.0 15.7 14.7 15.1 15.0 11.1 12.6 9.8 
East Asia 
          
 
Within East Asia 33.6 31.2 36.5 38.8 44.6 45.7 42.5 48.0 46.0 48.8 
 
With USA 21.1 17.0 25.4 17.5 22.0 16.2 23.7 14.1 18.1 9.1 
 
With Japan 11.6 11.6 8.5 13.0 8.5 15.4 8.6 12.7 7.1 10.7 
 
With Euro Area 16.0 10.0 17.9 15.0 15.1 14.3 15.8 11.5 15.4 10.1 
East Asia/Pacific 
          
 
Within East Asia / Pacific 37.0 36.6 39.5 42.3 47.1 48.2 45.0 50.6 48.6 51.9 
 
With USA 20.2 17.3 24.4 17.9 21.2 16.5 23.1 14.5 17.6 9.4 
 
With Japan 11.1 11.0 8.4 12.4 8.6 14.9 8.6 12.3 7.1 10.3 
 
With Euro Area 16.0 11.4 17.6 15.8 14.9 14.9 15.7 12.1 15.3 10.7 
Euro Area 
          
 
Within Euro Area 61.3 54.2 66.9 64.0 66.4 64.4 67.7 62.5 67.7 63.1 
 
With USA 5.3 8.2 6.9 7.3 6.5 7.2 9.1 7.9 7.5 4.8 
  With Asia 3.2 3.6 4.4 5.3 6.6 7.3 5.3 9.1 5.6 10.5 
1 ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
2 East Asia: ASEAN plus Japan, China, P.R.: mainland, China, P.R.: Hong Kong, Korea 
3 East Asia and Pacific Area : East Asia plus Australia, New Zealand 
4 Euro Area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal Spain. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, World Development Indicators June 2007 
6
9
 
 
 
Table 4.2 FTA/EPA Initiatives between selected Asian countries        
  Japan  China Korea Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines New Zealand Australia United States 
Japan  n.a.             
China n.a. n.a.            
Korea + n.a. n.a.           
Singapore **++ *+ *+ n.a.          
Hong Kong n.a. * n.a. n.a. n.a.         
Taiwan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.        
Malaysia +++ * + * n.a. n.a. n.a.       
Indonesia ++ * + * n.a. n.a. * n.a.      
Thailand +++ * + * n.a. n.a. * * n.a.     
Philippines ++++ * + * n.a. n.a. * * * n.a.    
New Zealand n.a. + n.a. ****++ + n.a. +++ ++ *++ ++ n.a.   
Australia - + n.a. **++ n.a. n.a. +++ ++ **++ +++ ** n.a.  
United States n.a. n.a. + ** n.a. n.a. + n.a. ++ n.a. n.a. ** n.a. 
Notes: * represents Existing FTA/RTA;  
           + represents FTA/RTA under negotiation;  
            - represents FTA/RTA under discussion;  
            n.a. means currently there is no FTA/RTA between two countries 
Source: from Asia-Pacific Economics Cooperation official sources 
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Table 4.3 Progress on BSAs under the Chiang Mai Initiative (as of October 10, 2007) 
 
Countries Currencies Conclusion Date Size 
Japan-Korea US$-Won February 24, 2006 US$10 billion (two-way) 
Korea-Japan US$-Yen February 24, 2006 US$5 billion (two-way) 
Japan-Korea Yen-Won May 27, 2005 US$3 billion (two-way) 
Japan-Thailand US$-Baht May 7, 2005 US$3 billion (two-way) 
Thailand-Japan US$-Yen May 7, 2005 US$3 billion (two-way) 
Japan-Thailand US$-Baht July 10, 2007 US$6 billion (two-way) 
Thailand-Japan US$-Yen July 10, 2007 US$3 billion (two-way) 
Japan-Philippines US$-Peso May 4, 2006 US$6 billion (two-way) 
Philippines-Japan US$-Yen May 4, 2006 US$500 million (two-way) 
Japan-Malaysia US$-Ringgit October 5, 2001 US$3.5 billiona (one-way) 
Japan-China Yen-Renminbi March 28, 2002 US$3 billion (two-way) 
Japan-Indonesia US$-Rupiah August 31, 2005 US$6 billion (one-way) 
Japan-Singapore US$-Singapore$ November 8, 2005 US$3 billion (two-way) 
Singapore-Japan US$-Yen November 8, 2005 US$1 billion (two-way) 
China-Korea Yuan-Won November 9, 2005 US$4 billion (two-way) 
China-Thailand US$-Baht December 6, 2001 US$2 billion (one-way) 
China-Philippines Renminbi-Peso August 9, 2003 US$1 billion (one-way) 
China-Malaysia US$-Ringgit October 9, 2002 US$1.5 billion (one-way) 
China-Indonesia US$-Rupiah November 9, 2005 US$2 billion (one-way) 
Korea-Thailand US$-Baht June 25, 2002 US$1 billion (two-way) 
Thailand-Korea US$-Won June 25, 2002 US$1 billion (two-way) 
Korea-Philippines US$-Peso November 9, 2005 US$1.5 billion (two-way) 
Philippines-Korea US$-Won November 9, 2005 US$1.5 billion (two-way) 
Korea-Malaysia US$-Ringgit November 9, 2005 US$1.5 billion (two-way) 
Malaysia-Korea US$-Won November 9, 2005 US$1.5 billion (two-way) 
Korea-Indonesia US$-Rupiah November 9, 2005 US$1 billion (two-way) 
Indonesia-Korea US$-Won November 9, 2005 US$1 billion (two-way) 
Notes: a. the amount includes US$2.5 billion committed on August 18, 1999 under the New Miyazawa Initiative. 
Source: Ministry of Finance Japan official resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Working Groups on the ABMI 
 
  
ABMI Working Groups Chair Changes 
WG1 New securitized debt instruments Thailand   
WG2 Credit guarantee and investment mechanisms Korea and PRC   
WG3 Foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues Malaysia   
WG4 Issuance of bonds denominated in local currencies by 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), foreign government 
agencies, and Asian multinational corporations 
PRC Conclusion of the 
operations upon 
completion of the 
mission 
WG5 Rating systems and information dissemination on Asian 
bond markets 
Singapore and Japan Used to be Rating 
systems and 
information 
dissemination on 
Asian bond markets 
WG6 Technical assistance coordination Indonesia, Philippines and 
Malaysia 
Converted to the TA 
Coordination Team 
for the Focal Group 
TACT 
Source: Asian Development Bank: AsianBondsOnline   
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Table 4.5 Asia and Pacific Stock Market Price Indices    
  Price index  Full name Unit Components Starting date 
Japan  Nikkei 225 Nikkei heikin kabuka Yen 225 companies in 36 
industries 
September 7, 1950 
 TOPIX Tokyo stock Price Index Yen 1700 domestic companies January 4,1968 
China SSEC Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index 
Renminbi Top 50 companies by market 
capitalization 
December 19, 1990 
Korea KOSPI Korea Composite Stock Price 
Index  
Won Over 700 components January 4, 1980 
Singapore STI Straits Times Index SGD 50 representative companies  September 1, 1998(a) 
Hong Kong HSI Hang Seng Index  HK$ 40 largest companies November 24, 1969 
Taiwan TAIEX Taiwan Capitalization Weighted 
Stock Index  
TW$ All listed common shares February 9, 1962 
Malaysia KLCI Kuala Lumpur Composite Index  Ringgit 100 companies from main 
board 
December 14, 1976 
Indonesia IHSG/JSXC Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan 
Jakarta Stock Exchange composite 
Rupiah 336 companies 1977 
Thailand SETI Stock Exchange of Thailand index Baht all common stocks (b) April 30, 1975 
Philippines PSECI/PHISIX/PSEi Philippine Stock Exchange 
Composite index 
Peso 31 companies August 8, 1927 
New Zealand NZSX50 New Zealand Stock Exchange 
index  
NZD 50 companies June 24 1991 
Australia AOI All Ordinaries Index AUD all ordinary (or common) 
shares  
January 1, 1980 
Notes: (a) STI replaced the Straits Times Industrials Index (STII) after September 1, 1998; (b) including unit trusts of property funds 
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Table 4.6 European Stock Market Price Indices 
   
  Price index  Full names Unit Components Starting time 
Austria ATX Austrian Traded Index Austrian Schilling/Euro 21 continuously traded Austrian companies listed on the 
Vienna Stock Exchange 
Jan 2, 1991 
Belgium Euronext 100 Euronext Brussels Belgian Franc/Euro Market capitalization index of the 150 next largest stocks Sep 22, 2000 
Denmark KFX Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange Index 
Danish Krone 20 Danish companies July 3, 1989 
Finland HEX-20 Helsinki Stock Exchange 
Index 
Finnish Markka/Euro Shares of the top 20 Finnish companies  Dec 28, 1990 
France CAC40 Compagnie des Agents de 
Change 40 index 
French Franc/Euro 40 French companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange 
that are also traded on the options market. 
Dec 31, 1987 
Germany DAX Deutscher Aktienindex German Mark/Euro 30 German companies Dec 30, 1987 
Greece FTSE/Athex 
140 
Athex Composite index 140 Greek Drachma/Euro 140 Greek companies 1996 
Ireland ISEQ Irish Stock Exchange Irish Pound/Euro the index is complied as a stock capitalisation weighted 
average 
Jan 4, 1988 
Italy MIB 30 Milano Italia Borsa Index 
30 
Italian Lira/Euro 30 Italian companies Dec 31, 1992 
Netherlands AEX European Options 
Exchange index 
Dutch Gulden/Euro 25 leading Dutch companies representative for the general 
trend on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
1983 
Portugal PSI-20 Portuguese Stock Index Portuguese Escudo/Euro 20 Portuguese companies Dec 31, 1992 
Spain IBEX 35 Lberia Index Spanish Peseta/Euro 35 Spanish companies Dec 29, 1989 
Norway OBX  Oslo Stock Exchange Index Norwegian Krone 25 Norwegian companies Jan 1, 1987 
Sweden SX-16  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
16 Index 
Swedish Krona Shares of the top 16 Swedish companies Dec 31, 1979 
Switzerland SMI Swiss Market Index Swiss Franc 21 Swiss companies June 30, 1988 
United 
Kingdom 
FT-SE 100 Financial Times Stock 
Exchange 100 Index 
Pound Sterling Shares of the top 100 UK companies ranked by market 
capitalization 
Dec 31, 1983 
Source: Wikipedia, individual stock exchange websites 
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Figure 4.2 East Asia Stock Markets Price indices (1989:6 to 2007:7) 
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Figure 4.3 European Stock Market Price Indices (1989:6 to 2007:10) 
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Table 4.7 Weights for building regional index proxy for East Asian countries, ωk 
COUNTRY JPN CHN KOR HK SIG MAL IND AUS NZ TAI PHI TW 
JPN 0.00 0.72 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.60 
CHN 0.43 0.00 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 
KOR 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
HK 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
SIG 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
MAL 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
IND 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
AUS 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
NZ 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TAI 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 
PHI 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
TW 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
 
Weights for building regional index proxy for European countries, ωk     
COUNTRY AUS BEL DEN FIN  FRA GRE GER IRE ITA NET POR SPA NOR SWE SWI UK 
AUS 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
BEL 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
DEN 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
FIN  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
FRA 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 
GRE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
GER 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.27 
IRE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ITA 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 
NET 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
POR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
SPA 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 
NOR 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 
SWE 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 
SWI 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 
UK 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00 
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Global index weights, ωj 
COUNTRY WEIGHT 
US 0.63 
UK 0.09 
GER 0.12 
FRA 0.08 
ITA 0.07 
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Table 4.8 Unit Root Tests 
        lnY(t)   ∆lnY(t) 
  ADF SP KPSS   ADF SP KPSS 
Austria 2.12 -0.94 14.47 
 
-17.38 -24.73 0.38 
Belgium 2.41 -1.60 24.65 
 
-17.93 -28.87 0.18 
Denmark 2.80 -1.77 27.61 
 
-17.27 -24.73 0.21 
Finland 1.37 -1.44 26.31 
 
-16.12 -30.79 0.18 
France 2.36 -1.99 27.56 
 
-17.27 -29.00 0.09 
Germany 2.12 -1.62 24.33 
 
-18.58 -30.38 0.10 
Greece 1.81 -1.32 21.30 
 
-16.16 -29.27 0.18 
Ireland 2.35 -2.05 28.68 
 
-16.96 -30.50 0.06 
Italy 1.34 -2.17 25.41 
 
-16.91 -30.37 0.09 
Netherlands 2.56 -1.36 25.30 
 
-18.98 -30.64 0.13 
Portugal 1.46 -1.57 19.72 
 
-16.76 -29.07 0.37 
Spain 1.92 -1.91 25.97 
 
-16.63 -27.70 0.20 
Norway 2.17 -1.52 22.85 
 
-17.17 -30.30 0.26 
Sweden 1.66 -1.85 25.00 
 
-16.82 -22.60 0.13 
Switzerland 2.95 -1.49 27.61 
 
-18.24 -30.41 0.12 
United Kingdom 2.18 -1.69 25.70 
 
-18.22 -31.90 0.09 
Japan -0.63 -2.25 17.18 
 
-21.73 -28.00 0.11 
China 0.74 -1.36 14.65 
 
-20.90 -29.70 0.26 
Korea, Rep 0.12 -1.99 17.84 
 
-20.84 -31.25 0.06 
Hong Kong 1.96 -1.42 21.57 
 
-19.86 -30.41 0.19 
Singapore 1.44 -1.44 10.61 
 
-20.70 -26.74 0.20 
Malaysia 0.58 -1.29 3.35 
 
-19.57 -27.21 0.15 
Taiwan -0.48 -2.40 1.46 
 
-20.22 -32.95 0.13 
Indonesia -0.62 -1.19 13.44 
 
-18.68 -25.41 0.24 
Australia 2.22 -1.76 23.97 
 
-19.99 -18.25 0.28 
New Zealand 1.42 -1.53 16.38 
 
-18.95 -20.38 0.23 
Thailand -0.12 -1.04 14.85 
 
-18.23 -27.11 0.27 
Philippines 0.14 -1.17 9.06   -17.70 -26.20 0.20 
Asymptotic critical value 
      ADF test:  1% -2.56  5% -1.94  10% -1.62 
SP test: 1% -3.56  5% -3.02  10% -2.75 
KPSS test: 1% 0.739  5% 0.463  10% 0.347 
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Table 4.9 Variance Decomposition of domestic index in sub-periods for European countries 
    Per I Per II Per III Per IV Per V Per VI Per VII Per VIII Average 
Austria U-G 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.33 0.12 
 
U-R 0.24 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.26 
 
U-D 0.58 0.67 0.78 0.69 0.78 0.59 0.59 0.29 0.62 
           Belgium U-G 0.33 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.24 
 
U-R 0.46 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.29 0.45 0.55 0.32 
 
U-D 0.21 0.74 0.60 0.74 0.79 0.26 0.14 0.09 0.45 
           Denmark U-G 0.31 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.24 
 
U-R 0.33 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.53 0.25 
 
U-D 0.36 0.76 0.64 0.54 0.65 0.40 0.54 0.23 0.52 
           Finland U-G 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.19 0.38 0.36 0.50 0.48 0.27 
 
U-R 0.20 0.09 0.24 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.11 
 
U-D 0.70 0.89 0.63 0.79 0.53 0.63 0.47 0.31 0.62 
           France U-G 0.29 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.48 0.75 0.63 0.45 0.38 
 
U-R 0.55 0.54 0.45 0.41 0.30 0.22 0.33 0.41 0.40 
 
U-D 0.17 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.22 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.22 
           Germany U-G 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.42 0.75 0.47 0.52 0.34 
 
U-R 0.44 0.39 0.26 0.42 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.33 0.32 
 
U-D 0.31 0.60 0.66 0.41 0.18 0.08 0.41 0.14 0.35 
           Greece U-G 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.08 
 
U-R 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.32 0.18 
 
U-D 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.61 0.52 0.48 0.75 
           Ireland U-G 0.12 0.05 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.31 0.38 0.24 0.21 
 
U-R 0.25 0.30 0.15 0.29 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.41 0.21 
 
U-D 0.63 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.73 0.62 0.48 0.35 0.58 
           Italy U-G 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.44 0.38 0.39 0.20 
 
U-R 0.19 0.10 0.39 0.10 0.52 0.17 0.44 0.34 0.28 
 
U-D 0.64 0.88 0.61 0.82 0.32 0.39 0.18 0.28 0.52 
           Netherlands U-G 0.25 0.01 0.35 0.29 0.40 0.66 0.68 0.49 0.39 
 
U-R 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.30 0.31 0.15 0.26 0.38 0.33 
 
U-D 0.46 0.54 0.19 0.41 0.29 0.19 0.06 0.14 0.29 
           Portugal U-G 0.21 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.14 0.26 0.14 
 
U-R 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.37 0.41 0.57 0.38 0.32 0.32 
 
U-D 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.54 0.52 0.17 0.48 0.42 0.54 
           Spain U-G 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.09 0.35 0.43 0.38 0.50 0.29 
 
U-R 0.36 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.38 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.29 
 
U-D 0.45 0.54 0.62 0.66 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.21 0.43 
           Norway U-G 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.16 
 
U-R 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.06 0.14 0.33 0.38 0.19 
 
U-D 0.82 0.79 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.60 0.48 0.43 0.65 
           Sweden U-G 0.29 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.31 0.55 0.49 0.42 0.30 
 
U-R 0.29 0.28 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.44 0.25 
 
U-D 0.42 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.46 
           Switzerland U-G 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.62 0.47 0.42 0.28 
 
U-R 0.37 0.43 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.33 0.26 
 
U-D 0.32 0.54 0.66 0.75 0.64 0.17 0.36 0.26 0.46 
           United Kingdom U-G 0.17 0.04 0.35 0.18 0.49 0.68 0.56 0.44 0.36 
 
U-R 0.42 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.30 0.25 
 
U-D 0.41 0.55 0.32 0.57 0.46 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.39 
           Average U-G 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.25 
 
U-R 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.37 0.26 
  U-D 0.50 0.68 0.60 0.63 0.53 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.49 
Notes: Per I: 1989:7:1 - 1991:6:30; Per II: 1991:7:1 - 1993:6:30; Per III: 1993:7:1 - 1995:6:30; Per IV: 1995:7:1 - 1997:6:30; 
            Per V: 1999:1:1 - 2000:12:31; Per VI: 2001:1:1 - 2002:12:31; Per VII: 2003:1:1 - 2004:12:31; Per VIII: 2005:1:1 - 2006:12:31  
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Table 4.10 Variance Decomposition of domestic index in sub-periods for Asian countries 
    Per I Per II Per III Per IV Per V Per VI Per VII Per VIII Average 
Japan U-G 0.19 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.14 
 
U-R 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
 
U-D 0.79 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.83 
           China U-G 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.04 
 
U-R 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 
 
U-D 0.88 0.98 0.92 0.82 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.92 
           Korea U-G 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.25 0.34 0.21 0.18 0.14 
 
U-R 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.03 
 
U-D 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.71 0.59 0.78 0.75 0.83 
           Hong Kong U-G 0.24 0.03 0.19 0.22 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.27 
 
U-R 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 
 
U-D 0.74 0.95 0.79 0.75 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.68 
           Singapore U-G 0.42 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.32 0.22 
 
U-R 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.22 0.07 
 
U-D 0.55 0.85 0.84 0.93 0.70 0.67 0.68 0.45 0.71 
           Malaysia U-G 0.17 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.30 0.12 
 
U-R 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.05 0.04 
 
U-D 0.82 0.98 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.74 0.66 0.84 
           Taiwan U-G 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.09 
 
U-R 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 
U-D 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.76 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.86 
           Indonesia U-G 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.06 
 
U-R 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02 
 
U-D 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.85 0.78 0.91 
           Thailand U-G 0.28 0.09 0.21 0.02 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.17 
 
U-R 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.05 
 
U-D 0.71 0.86 0.79 0.95 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.78 
           Philippines U-G 0.19 0.10 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.17 
 
U-R 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.03 
 
U-D 0.81 0.89 0.77 0.83 0.70 0.91 0.80 0.67 0.80 
           Australia U-G 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.29 0.17 0.34 0.16 
 
U-R 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 
 
U-D 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.68 0.81 0.61 0.81 
           New Zealand U-G 0.12 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.31 0.07 0.14 0.12 
 
U-R 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.05 
 
U-D 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.96 0.81 0.69 0.89 0.76 0.82 
           Average U-G 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.22 0.14 
 
U-R 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.04 
  U-D 0.83 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.70 0.82 
Notes: Per I: 1989:7:1 - 1991:6:30; Per II: 1991:7:1 - 1993:6:30; Per III: 1993:7:1 - 1995:6:30; Per IV: 1995:7:1 - 1997:6:30; 
             Per V: 1999:1:1 - 2000:12:31; Per VI: 2001:1:1 - 2002:12:31; Per VII: 2003:1:1 - 2004:12:31; Per VIII: 2005:1:1 - 2006:12:31    
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Table 4.11 Robustness test 1: Variance Decomposition of domestic index in sub-periods for Asian countries 
    Per I Per II Per III Per IV Per V Per VI Per VII Per VIII Average 
China U-G 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 
 
U-R 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.04 
 
U-D 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.84 0.93 
           Korea U-G 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.27 0.12 
 
U-R 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 
U-D 0.87 0.87 0.97 0.92 0.82 0.72 0.84 0.67 0.84 
           Hong Kong U-G 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.17 
 
U-R 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.26 0.09 
 
U-D 0.77 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.52 0.59 0.68 0.61 0.74 
           Singapore U-G 0.37 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.31 0.48 0.21 
 
U-R 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.10 
 
U-D 0.63 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.65 0.68 0.53 0.38 0.69 
           Malaysia U-G 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.24 0.12 0.10 
 
U-R 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.11 
 
U-D 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.85 0.73 0.59 0.62 0.80 
           Taiwan U-G 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.08 
 
U-R 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 
 
U-D 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.75 0.87 0.83 0.74 0.88 
           Indonesia U-G 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.05 
 
U-R 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.05 
 
U-D 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.96 0.75 0.83 0.90 
           Thailand U-G 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.12 
 
U-R 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.08 
 
U-D 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.80 
           Philippines U-G 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.29 0.07 
 
U-R 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.16 0.09 
 
U-D 0.93 0.90 1.00 0.86 0.72 0.84 0.88 0.55 0.84 
           Australia U-G 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.11 
 
U-R 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.07 
 
U-D 0.96 0.89 0.77 0.84 0.88 0.85 0.70 0.68 0.82 
           New Zealand U-G 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.10 
 
U-R 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.26 0.14 0.07 
 
U-D 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.98 0.92 0.81 0.66 0.72 0.82 
           Average U-G 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.11 
 
U-R 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.07 
  U-D 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.82 
Notes: Per I: 1989:7:1 - 1991:6:30; Per II: 1991:7:1 - 1993:6:30; Per III: 1993:7:1 - 1995:6:30; Per IV: 1995:7:1 - 1997:6:30; 
             Per V: 1999:1:1 - 2000:12:31; Per VI: 2001:1:1 - 2002:12:31; Per VII: 2003:1:1 - 2004:12:31; Per VIII: 2005:1:1 - 2006:12:31  
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Table 4.12 Robustness test 2: Variance Decomposition of domestic index in sub-periods for Asian countries 
    Per I Per II Per III Per IV Per V Per VI Per VII Per VIII Average 
Japan U-G 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
U-R 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.17 
 
U-D 0.93 0.75 0.95 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.81 
           Korea U-G 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 
 
U-R 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.31 0.12 0.24 0.14 
 
U-D 0.87 0.85 0.97 0.91 0.80 0.67 0.86 0.72 0.83 
           Hong Kong U-G 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.05 
 
U-R 0.31 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.09 0.19 
 
U-D 0.68 0.98 0.97 0.76 0.60 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.76 
           Singapore U-G 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.04 
 
U-R 0.46 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.42 0.24 
 
U-D 0.53 0.83 0.96 0.90 0.76 0.74 0.60 0.44 0.72 
           Malaysia U-G 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.18 0.06 
 
U-R 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.07 0.11 
 
U-D 0.77 0.88 0.90 0.84 0.91 0.88 0.67 0.75 0.83 
           Taiwan U-G 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 
 
U-R 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.09 
 
U-D 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.73 0.88 0.84 0.73 0.88 
           Indonesia U-G 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 
 
U-R 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.05 
 
U-D 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.83 0.86 0.92 
           Thailand U-G 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.02 
 
U-R 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.34 0.19 0.20 0.14 
 
U-D 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.80 0.66 0.74 0.74 0.84 
           Philippines U-G 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.05 
 
U-R 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.25 0.08 
 
U-D 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.64 0.87 
           Australia U-G 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.06 
 
U-R 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.10 
 
U-D 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.84 0.71 0.85 
           New Zealand U-G 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.04 
 
U-R 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.12 0.10 
 
U-D 0.82 0.84 0.93 0.98 0.87 0.76 0.87 0.75 0.85 
           Average U-G 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.04 
 
U-R 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.13 
  U-D 0.84 0.89 0.95 0.88 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.70 0.83 
Notes: Per I: 1989:7:1 - 1991:6:30; Per II: 1991:7:1 - 1993:6:30; Per III: 1993:7:1 - 1995:6:30; Per IV: 1995:7:1 - 1997:6:30; 
             Per V: 1999:1:1 - 2000:12:31; Per VI: 2001:1:1 - 2002:12:31; Per VII: 2003:1:1 - 2004:12:31; Per VIII: 2005:1:1 - 2006:12:31  
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